

THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF THE NETHERLANDS INDIES
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INTRODUCTION

The period of the Japanese occupation of the Netherlands East Indies can be chronologically divided into five phases, namely:

- I. The transition phase from March to August 1942, involving the forcible initiation of the destruction and elimination of all Occidental and democratic institutions and influences, and their substitution by Japanese and fascist institutions, influences and monopolies.
- II. The second phase, characterized by the final establishment of the Japanese administration, and lasting from August 1942 to July 1943.
- III. The next phase, from July 1943 to September 1944, governed by the new directive from Tokyo: "the winning over of the population". A policy of promises was introduced.
- IV. The fourth phase from September 1944 to the beginning of August 1945 involving further development of the policy of promises.
- V. The fifth phase, from the beginning of August 1945 to the end of September 1945, involving the last consolidated effort made by Japanese imperialism; at the very last moment an attempt was made to create a state, friendly to Japan, in the South.

The phases mentioned above have been somewhat arbitrarily divided into periods; naturally these cannot be rigidly demarcated, and overlap each other in the various phases. Consequently these limits must be treated as being approximate. Moreover, in this survey, these periods have not been strictly adhered to; occasionally for a better understanding a certain subject has been exhaustively treated in one of the phases,

even if the events in question extended beyond one particular phase.

In this survey what happened in Java is treated as basic, since Java affords the clearest picture of the application of the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere idea. Moreover, Japan's policy in regard to the Southern Regions was broadly laid down in Tokyo for all regions alike, so that only somewhat insignificant local modifications were made, and those solely in the application of these principles, not affecting the principles themselves. Therefore, mention will merely be made of those modifications in other regions of the Netherlands Indies (the so-called Outer Islands), which reveal important deviation from events in Java.

In this survey, Japanese names are transcribed according to the spelling used by the Japanese authorities in Java, in Malay language publications. Hereinafter, the translation of Japanese designations of Government offices, bureaus etc., aims at giving an accurate idea of what the actual functions of these offices etc., in the East Indies were.

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During this transition phase, the execution of these plans discloses the forceful initiation of the following four points of Japanese policy:

1. The elimination of all Occidental influences.
2. The abolition of all democratic institutions.
3. The substitution therefor of certain Japanese influences by centralized, autocratic Japanese institutions, based on the fascist model:
Japanization and modelling on Fascism.
4. In the sphere of economics and finance:
again the elimination of Occidental influences and institutions, and the substitution therefor of Japanese monopolies and institutions.

1. The elimination of all Occidental influences.

a. Internment.

Throughout the East Indies, according to the progress of military conquest that began on 11 January 1942 with the attack on Tarakan, the entire Occidental group of influential persons in the administration, in the field of commerce, industry etc., was immediately and systematically interned in prisons and camps hastily prepared for that purpose.

Exceptions were provisionally made in the case of those Occidentals, who could not as yet be replaced by Japanese. As soon, however, as the Japanese replacing them arrived, this group was also interned; and a small remaining group of worker was also confined in separate camps, and their contact with the outer world was as much as possible restricted.

On the other hand, not only Occidentals were interned, but also a large group of prominent Chinese, mainly on the ground of their past support of the Chiang Kai-shek regime, and on suspicion of their anti-Japanese attitude.

The internment of these groups became stricter in the course of time. From July 1942 these measures were, moreover, gradually applied to Occidental women.

By the end of 1943 the position had become more or less stable, so that it may be said that all Occidentals not born in the Netherlands Indies, both male and female, had been interned, with a few local exceptions in the case of men and women above 65 or 70 years of age. Moreover, all Occidentals born in the Netherlands Indies who still showed apparent affinity with the Occidental world were interned, whereas those Asiatics, too, who were "suspected" of having Occidental sympathies were confined in camps. According to official Japanese returns dated 1 September 1945, at the end of the war 62,532 persons (i.e. 20,676 males, 28,169 females and approximately 13,687 children) were interned in Java. Besides, all Occidental military personnel were made prisoners of war; this involved 45,000 men who, with the exception of 6,107 men were drafted from Java for slave labour elsewhere.

Of the former Western community, only three groups were still "free"; namely, the group of Axis subjects (who were not interned until after the defeat of their fatherland), few neutrals and a category of non-interned Eurasians. These groups were rigidly spied upon, and prevented from the exercise of their "freedom" in many other ways.

b. Terrorization of the remaining Occidental Community.

So far as any of the Occidental community was left, it was subjected to very heavy pressure. On the one hand, these vestiges of the Occidental community were continuously spied

PERSONAL HISTORY

My name is Klaas A. de Weerd. I am a Major in the Artillery of the reserve of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army.

I was born in Roermond, Limburg, the Netherlands, on 6 April 1904. I am of Netherlands nationality.

After having studied law at the University of Leiden (the Netherlands) I entered a lawyers' office at Sourabaya (Java) on 28 August 1929 and practised in the Law Courts of East-Java, Bali and the South East of Borneo until the middle of 1937.

In 1938, after having been on leave in the Netherlands, I was employed for nearly a year in the Labour Office (Labour Legislation Section) of the Department of Justice of the Netherlands Indies Government at Batavia. From the beginning of 1939 I entered into partnership in a lawyers' office at Medan (Sumatra).

On the 12th of December 1941 I was mobilized as an officer of the reserve of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army and served as such with the Staff of the First Division in West-Java.

After the capitulation of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army, I became a prisoner of war of the Japanese and was confined in several camps in West-Java until the middle of September 1945. From the beginning of this period I acted as camp translator of the Java newspapers in the Malay language. The Japanese camp authorities allowed Malay language newspapers to be brought into the camps until the end of January 1944.

As the situation in the islands interested me in particular I spent much time in translating these items extensively into Dutch and, together with several friends, I indexed these data according to personalities and to subjects.

Our intention was to prepare several studies concerning the Japanese occupation, treating subjects such as Administration, Propaganda, Civil Affairs, Central Government, Labour, Policy, etc. as well as to gather personal data about Japanese authoriti

I had already prepared notes for several of these studies when it became increasingly difficult to keep this work secret from the Japanese guards. As in January 1944 it became clear that we would shortly be moved to another camp we soldered copies of our compilations and indexes in tins and buried them in various places in the camp grounds.

From February 1944 until September 1945 I kept abreast of actual developments in the Netherlands East Indies by reading Malay or (translated) Japanese language newspapers occasionally smuggled in, and by listening-in secretly to the Japanese local broadcasts in Malay. During that period I continually exchanged information and observations with new arrivals and through every other channel available.

After 15 August 1945 I once more regularly received Malay newspapers and in the beginning of September 1945 I recovered one complete copy of my compilations and indexes from their hiding place. In the middle of the same month I was released from the prison camp and was assigned to the Political Section of the Chief Commanding Officer of the N.I.C.A. (Netherlands Indies Civil Administration), later called the Allied Military Administration Civil Affairs Branch, for Java, in order to complete my work of collecting data about the Japanese occupation. A special section with a staff of twenty was created for this purpose under my direction; this section became a special branch of Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service (Headquarters at Batavia) in January 1946.

In close cooperation with the Japanese Affairs Section of said N.E.F.I.S., with S.E.A.T.I.C. (South East Asia Translators and Interpreters' Corps) and other offices and bureaus I collected such data regarding the Japanese occupation as were available. These data were contained in, inter alia, the practically complete newspapers and the complete Official Gazette "Osamu Kan Po" of the 16th Army in Java, and a fairly complete

set of the official gazettes of the other islands, edited during the occupation period, further reports and surveys by Japanese, Dutch, Indonesian and other military and civilian authorities and private persons, seized Japanese and Malay official and non-official documents, interrogations of Japanese and Indonesian authorities, etc.

In May 1946 I joined the Office of the Attorney General, Netherlands East Indies, with the special task of collecting such documents as would be needed for the preparation of the Prosecution of suspected Japanese Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal at Tokyo and in this capacity I continued my work of collecting data on the Japanese occupation of the East Indies.

In the middle of September 1946 I arrived at Tokyo as a representative of the Attorney General, Netherlands East Indies, to continue my search for further data here.

From this collected information I have prepared the attached report, entitled: "the Japanese occupation of the Netherlands Indies".

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b. Terrorization of the remaining Occidental Community.

So far as any of the Occidental community was left, it was subjected to very heavy pressure. On the one hand, these vestiges of the Occidental community were continuously spied

upon by the Japanese Military Police (Kempei) and its henchmen, while moreover, they were intimidated by continuous wholesale arrests and trials involving hundreds of victims, and by the fact that interrogation by the Kempei as well as the treatment accorded by Japanese Courts Martial were such that the victims, deprived of all rights, were abandoned to arbitrary maltreatment and starvation methods.

c. The dismissal of Occidentals from official positions and employment.

On the other hand, Occidentals were, whenever possible, dismissed from positions and appointment held by them, whether in an official or private capacity, so that the greater part of this section of the community was deprived of its means of livelihood. The position was aggravated by the fact that all bank balances had been immediately frozen; Occidental banks were liquidated, and the percentage payable in respect of liquidations were not paid out to the Occidental community or those who had been interned. The remaining Occidentals were faced with practically no other alternative than to save their lives by gradually selling all their possessions, and were further handicapped by the fact that the Japanese mercilessly requisitioned whatever took their fancy, generally without payment of any compensation. By introducing compulsory registration and the payment of registration fees - (150 guilders for Europeans; 75 guilders for Chinese and other non-Indonesian Asiatics) - the Japanese military authorities made the position still more difficult for these communities.

d. Ban on Western languages.

Along with this, the use of Western languages was soon forbidden, whether in postal-, telephonic- or telegraphic- communication, as well as in intercourse in offices and the like, i.e., in public, whereas in certain places the speaking of Western languages was forbidden even within the home; and in any case those who

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used a Western language at home, were suspected by the Kempei, and exposed themselves to the arbitrary methods employed by that organization.

e. Ban on Western education and the closing down of all schools.

At the same time, the Japanese immediately began to close down all schools, and we shall see that during the second period Occidental schools and Occidental education remained definitely banned.

f. Ban on listening-in to foreign broadcasts.
The sealing and registration of all wireless sets.

The isolation of the Southern Regions from all Western influence was further achieved by the promulgation in April 1942 of a ban on listening-in to radio broadcasts from outside the East Indies. This prohibition was enforced by the compulsory sealing and registration of all wireless sets, which were sealed to make them unsuitable for the reception of short-wave broadcasts, - the only broadcasts that could reach the East Indies from abroad. Moreover, this prohibition was rigorously enforced by the well-known Kempei methods; and, for instance, in July 1942, sentences were pronounced and published by the Japanese Court Martial by way of intimidation, whereby persons who had listened-in to foreign broadcasts despite the ban and/or had spread news therefrom, were, inter alia, sentenced to death.

Throughout the course of the Japanese occupation, persons suspected of having failed to comply with this prohibition were regularly seized by the Kempei and tortured, whether or not followed by a severe sentence.

g. Ban on Western Books.

The possession of a very great number of specified books in enemy languages constituted a punishable offence. Such books had to be handed over and were burnt.

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The isolation of the Southern Regions from all Western influence was further achieved by the promulgation in April 1942 of a ban on listening-in to radio broadcasts from outside the East Indies. This prohibition was enforced by the compulsory sealing and registration of all wireless sets, which were sealed to make them unsuitable for the reception of short-wave broadcasts, - the only broadcasts that could reach the East Indies from abroad. Moreover, this prohibition was rigorously enforced by the well-known Kempei methods; and, for instance, in July 1942, sentences were pronounced and published by the Japanese Court Martial by way of intimidation, whereby persons who had listened-in to foreign broadcasts despite the ban and/or had spread news therefrom, were, inter alia, sentenced to death.

Throughout the course of the Japanese occupation, persons suspected of having failed to comply with this prohibition were regularly seized by the Kempei and tortured, whether or not followed by a severe sentence.

g. Ban on Western Books.

The possession of a very great number of specified books in enemy languages constituted a punishable offence. Such books had to be handed over and were burnt.

used a Western language at home, were suspected by the Kempei, and exposed themselves to the arbitrary methods employed by that organization.

e. Ban on Western education and the closing down of all schools.

At the same time, the Japanese immediately began to close down all schools, and we shall see that during the second period Occidental schools and Occidental education remained definitely banned.

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h. The destruction of monuments, and the like.

Old monuments, - reminders of former Occidental influence - were carried away, partly destroyed, or otherwise stored in warehouses.

In most places, the names of streets were altered into Japanese, or sometimes Malay. The names of various places, - reminiscent of Western influence - were changed into Malay, sometimes also into Japanese; e.g., "Batavia" became "Djakarta"; "Singapore" became "Shonan".

Names of shops, commercial concerns, trademarks, etc., could no longer appear in Western languages, but had to be transcribed into Japanese or Malay.

1. Terrorization of the non-European communities.

Through a combination of these measures the Japanese succeeded in eliminating practically all Occidental influences from society in the East Indies.

In view of the fact that the Kempei-methods were practised not only on the Occidental community, but also upon other communities, when one of their members could possibly be suspected of being anti-Japanese or pro-democratic, the result achieved was that all expression of democratic or pro-Occidental sympathies within those groups was silenced. Furthermore, these groups were subjected to the constant threat of espionage and Kempei-methods.

2. The Abolition of all Democratic Institutions.

a. The abolition of all central and local administrative councils.

The elimination of all Occidental elements was, moreover, accomplished by the abolition of all existing Councils wherein, hitherto, the opinion of various communities could be freely expressed on problems of administration.

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The first to be dissolved was the Peoples' Council, established in 1918, with its Indonesian majority, which together with the Governor-General exercised legislative functions, and, inter alia, decided on the national budget.

Next, the Provincial Councils of Java disappeared, which had hitherto assisted the Governors of the three Provinces of Java in their governmental and welfare activities, and which had to decide on the budget of the province concerned.

The Municipal Councils, which assisted the mayor of the municipality, and with the latter directed affairs in the bigger towns, were similarly abolished; the same was the case with the Regency Councils, which assisted the Regent in his administration of the Regency (a district unit); both types of councils also exercised budgetary functions.

In regions outside Java, too, the various councils which, during the course of years, had been established on a democratic basis in order to give the population an opportunity of participation in the administration of their country, were liquidated by a stroke of the pen.

b. The Abolition of the existing Courts.

By Ordinance No. 14 of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, Java dated 29 April 1942, all existing law courts were abolished, and in their stead Japanese "Law Courts of the Military Government" (Gunsei Hoo'in) were established. This new judiciary was provisional and was later replaced by a definitive organization.

The provisional organization made no provision for appeals. All appeals were deemed to have been decided in appeal by confirmation of the decision of the Court of first instance.

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principles ensuring a clear definition of criminal acts and the reliability of evidence in criminal cases, the recognition of very arbitrary powers vested in a judge trying criminal cases.

c. Ban on almost all associations and political activities.

By Ordinances Nos. 2 and 3 of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, Java, dated 8 and 20 March 1942 respectively, all meetings, associations etc. were forbidden. By Ordinance No. 23 of 15 July 1942 this prohibition was not only explicitly maintained, but also all chairmen were ordered to dissolve their respective associations (without being permitted to summon a meeting for that purpose).

Only associations solely concerned with sport and recreation were excepted, as well as scientific, cultural charitable and distributing organizations.

Further developments will show that these sorts of associations were to be coordinated with, or incorporated in, Japanese-sponsored fascist organizations. Even associations not prohibited were restricted in their activities; they were subjected to police supervision, and could only resume their activities after obtaining permission from the police, and registration. Meetings had to be authorized by the police.

In practice, activities were permitted only those associations, which accepted Japanese leadership and which could be used for propaganda purposes, as, e.g., the Ikatan Sport Indonesia (I.S.I., Indonesian Sport League).

3. The Initiation of Japanization.

a. The organization of means for Japanization.
The founding of a powerful propaganda machine.

Owing to the elimination of all Occidental and democratic elements from society in the East Indies, Japanese propaganda was given free play. In order to take full advantage of this, the Japanese authorities built up a very extensive propaganda machine.

Along with the very first troops to land on Java, came the vanguard of the previously organized propaganda machine. According to their own version, often these Malay speaking propagandists even preceded the troops, and organized their propaganda before the troops entered a certain town. With a mixture of threats and promises they incited the population to greet the entry of the troops with Japanese flags supplied by themselves. Such demonstrations were then filmed by them.

In addition to demonstrations of this nature, these Japanese propagandists, organized in the Propaganda Section ("Barisan Propaganda") of the Japanese 16th Army (Osamu Butai), tried to establish immediate contact with prominent Indonesian and Chinese politicians, whom they knew from elaborate espionage and intelligence conducted before the war, to be opposed to Occidental rule. With the assistance of these dissatisfied persons, in April 1942 the so-called "Tiga A" movement was established, which was fundamentally a movement sponsored by the abovenamed "Barisan Propaganda". Local committees, consisting entirely of Indonesians were set up to carry on the activities of this movement; but such committees had no other function than to carry out activities planned by the local Japanese propagandists. More will be said later about this, as well as about the Japanese propaganda movement.

It may yet be mentioned in regard to the transition phase, now being treated, that these propagandists immediately seized control of all means of public expression. Consequently, all public and private radio broadcasts as well as the entire Press were immediately placed under their control. For about two months after the occupation, these broadcasts and newspapers were still permitted to be transmitted and to appear in Dutch. As soon, however, as the propaganda machine had been sufficiently organized, an end was put to this: all newspapers were for-

bidden, and in their stead new papers were introduced, appearing in Malay under the direction of Indonesian and Chinese pressmen carefully chosen by the Japanese propaganda service. Thus, on the Emperor's birthday (29th April 1942), the first new Malay language daily paper in Java, the "Asia Raya" (Greater Asia) was established. This paper, from then on continued to appear regularly until 9 September 1945, as the most important organ for voicing Japanese propaganda: "Pusat Persurat Kabar" (Heart of the Press). At first it was under Japanese direction; but after the Indonesian staff had proved themselves "matured" the direction was officially handed over to them. In reality, the direction remained in Japanese hands.

Other places in Java soon followed suit, so that ultimately Japanese controlled newspapers in Malay were issued by the Japanese propagandists in five places in Java.

Apart from these, a Japanese language paper, the Jawa Shimbun, was published in Batavia.

b. The institution of censorship.

On the one hand, the Japanese hereby controlled every word that was uttered in public; on the other, a rigid censorship was instituted.

This censorship not only affected all postal-, telegraphic- and telephonic- communication, - (facilitated by the fact that such communications had been considerably restricted, inter alia by only allowing post cards, written in languages of which the censor was master with, of course, a ban on the use of Western languages) - but also extended to all photographs given to professional photographers for development, which could only be returned to the owner after censorship by the Japanese authority concerned.

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press, which were already entirely in the hands of the propaganda service, but also to theatrical performances, sermons, and the like. Gradually, for that matter, even theatrical companies, etc. were taken over by the propaganda service.

The publication of books was also subject to censorship. In any case, practically speaking only works emanating from the propaganda service appeared during the period of occupation.

By means of this censorship, through the further rigorous application of Kempei methods, combined with a reorganization of the police in the Japanese sense, and the institution of certain espionage organizations by way of auxiliary police, the Japanese were in a position both to control all expressions of public opinion, as well as to sound unexpressed public opinion, as will be treated in greater detail later on.

c. Further Japanization.

In addition to the Japanization of the press and radio, in other regions, too, during the period now being treated Japanization of the Southern Regions was begun.

For instance, the use of Japanese words was immediately introduced for the designation of official services, offices, their chiefs etc. This use of Japanese words gradually gained prevalence during the occupation, so that ultimately the reading of a Malay language newspaper was scarcely possible without knowledge of the offices, services, institutions, organizations, ideas, etc., referred to by Japanese words.

Soon after the occupation, the Japanese authorities introduced the Japanese system of dating years: 1942 became 2602, and so forth.

Even the Japanese time had to be adopted, so that the sun no longer rose at 6 o'clock, but only at half-past seven in the morning.

In 1943 (2603) the Japanese Budgetary year, running from 1 April to 31 March was introduced for all services and institutions.

The police were fitted out with the Japanese flag for cap badges. Emperor worship - however offensive to the followers of Islam - was introduced; all public gatherings and meetings were commenced with the obligatory bow in the direction of the Tokyo palace. Most meetings ended with the words: "Tenno Heika - banzai". All Japanese days of celebration, such as the Emperor's birthday (Tenchosetsu, 29 April) and Meiji day (Meijisetsu, 3 November) were introduced. The display of any other than the Japanese flag was forbidden. On the abovenamed days of celebration the Japanese flag had to be flown on all official and private buildings. For private individuals there were exact rules prescribing the measurements of the Japanese flag they were obliged to display, and how it should be displayed.

Portraits and other pictures of members of the Dutch and Allied Royal families and other prominent personalities were forbidden; these had to be handed over and were burnt.

The possession of portraits and other pictures of the Japanese Imperial family was governed by rules aimed at ensuring that there should be no "lese-majesty", for instance, through a portrait of the Emperor hanging aslant.

Postage- and revenue- stamps were impressed with a stamp "Dai Nippon"; later on, new postage- and revenue- stamps were issued with texts in Malay and Japanese reading "Dai Nippon".

The Japanese at once also began establishing schools which only aimed at teaching the Japanese language. Owing to the fact that this took place during a period when all other schools were still closed, large numbers immediately attended such institutions. When schools for Indonesians were reopened with a curriculum revised to meet Japanese requirements, an important subject in the new schedule appeared to be lessons in the Japanese language and

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The Japanization of the East Indies was systematically continued during the next phases, as will be shown in the discussion thereof.

4. In the Financial and Economic Fields: again the elimination of Western influences and institutions, and the substitution of Japanese monopolies and institutions therefor.

In the fields of finance and economics the transition period was characterized by several measures which, as in the case of the points already dealt with, bore evident trace of the policy previously laid down for the acquisition of the Southern Regions. It was apparent that the Japanese were acting in accordance with a previously devised plan, brought out, inter alia, by the similarity of its basic principles in both the areas occupied by the respective Japanese armies, as well as in the areas occupied by the Japanese Navy.

Indeed, between these areas, for instance, between Java and Sumatra, which islands were occupied by different Japanese armies (the 16th in Java, and the 25th in Sumatra), as between Java and Celebes, Borneo, the Moluccas, Timor, etc., which latter areas were occupied by the Japanese Navy, practically no contact existed from the very outset. The fact that nevertheless the basic principles upon which these regions were administered were entirely similar in reality, shows all the more clearly that these guiding principles were laid down in Tokyo.

In the sphere of finance, the very first Ordinance of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, Java, dated 7 March 1942, No. 1, introduced Japanese military paper currency with the text in Dutch, reading: "The Japanese Government. One half guilder". Paper money was issued similarly in other denomination. Side by side with this military currency, at first the paper money

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already in circulation was retained; but later on in the course of 1943 and 1944, when this old currency appeared to have considerably greater value in the open market than the Japanese occupation money, it was withdrawn and possession of it constituted a punishable offence. The Japanese paper money had been prepared long before, and revealed differences in the various occupied areas. So in Sumatra, which was originally under the same military administration as Malaya, the same text appeared on the same background as in the case of the paper money issued in Java, but in English; whereas in the other regions of the East Indies, as well as in Portuguese Timor, the Dutch text was used.

During the course of 1944, the originally printed paper money had given out, and new paper money was designed and printed in Batavia, with the same text; but now in Japanese and Malay. It is noticeable that this paper money sometimes had serial letters, but never numbers.

The unlimited issue of this paper money without backing, soon led to inflation. This inflation, which had already set in at the beginning of 1943, continued to increase at an ever faster rate, until by the middle of 1945 this paper money only had about a fortieth of its original purchasing value.

In the economic field Western capital was immediately rendered powerless. All banks were closed down at once, both official and semi-official banks, such as "The Java Bank" (the circulation bank), the Post Office Savings Bank, and the Peoples' General Credit Bank, as well as the private banks. During the course of 1942 and 1943 the Java Bank and private banks were liquidated. The Post Office Savings Bank and the Peoples' General Credit Bank which largely had Indonesian clients, were reopened under Japanese names and under Japanese direction, but the balances due at the time of the closing remained frozen. Later on, the cash deposits of Indonesian clients were partly unfrozen; the deposits of the Occidental community, and also

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of all those who had been interned or imprisoned, remained definitely frozen, and were transferred to the Enemy Property Administration Bureau established by the Japanese.

This latter institution (Tekisan Kanribu) was charged with the "custody" of enemy movables. In theory it was only to be administered; but in practice this "administration" led to the almost complete destruction of Western assets. At any rate, the management of this institution far exceeded the proper limits of administration. This Japanese institution liquidated nearly all confiscated property, and credited in its books the owners thereof, when known, for the proceeds in practically valueless Japanese paper money.

Later it appeared that after May 1945, this liquidation was hastened, and the public auctions by which these liquidations were effected were to a great extent only camouflage. For example, it appeared in Batavia that the Kempei and members of the Kempei were frequently the purchasers at these so-called public auctions, whereby the proceeds in Japanese occupation money bore no reasonable relation to the real price in the same paper money in the open market.

In this way, all stocks of Occidental importers, as well as private possessions in the form of movables, such as clothing, furniture, jewelry, etc., also claims for payment (when capable of realisation) held by Occidental business concerns and individuals, were translated into valueless claims in Japanese paper money on the abovenamed Tekisan Kanribu. Possession of "enemy property" constituted a punishable offence. Whoever was in possession of such property was obliged to hand it over. Even non-interned Eurasians were considered enemy nationals, so that rents, due them, had to be paid to the Japanese.

Before the war, in the Netherlands Indies big capital, chiefly contributed by Occidentals, had been invested in agricultural enterprises and industries. The agricultural enterprises (excepting sugar-factories, which were organized in the "Java Togyo Rengo Kai") were brought by the Japanese under the "Saibai Kigyoo Kanrikoodan". This body had a dual function: on the one hand, the administration of the "enemy" agricultural enterprises (for the conduct of these duties it was responsible to the Tekisan Kanribu) including, therefore, those operated with Indonesian or Chinese capital. The direction of this agricultural production was of an entirely totalitarian character; little attention was paid to the interests of owners; production was dependent upon the consent of this body, whereas the policy thereby followed was, on the one hand, directed towards the carrying out of a rigorous war effort and, on the other, to the maintenance of production required by the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. This implied therefore, on the one hand, that those enterprises and industries which were of no importance to the immediate war effort, were whenever possible switched over to other production, or when that was not feasible, would only be retained if such retention were deemed worthwhile from the point of view of the anticipated requirements of the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere at the end of the war. As a result, tea- and rubber-plantations, for instance, suffered seriously, because the Japanese, during the later stages of the occupation, gave precedence to foodcrops over maintenance of those plantations, which were not at that time essential. Tea-plants and rubbertrees were chopped and used for firewood, the estates being parcelled out amongst local farmers to increase areas for foodcrops.

A large part of the Western-owned agricultural enterprises has been liquidated. For instance, the entire sugar industry was allotted in 6 or 7 blocks to the large Japanese sugar companies, and thereafter continued to be exploited by them under the continued direction and control of the abovementioned body.

As only comparatively little sugar was necessary for the immediate war needs of Japan, and the production capacity of the sugar factories in Java was approximately eight times in excess of local demand, production here was reduced considerably and the machinery belonging to the unworked sugar-factories was to a great extent destined for scrap iron and carried off, if the factories concerned were not switched over to produce other more important products for the war effort, such as alcohol, butanol, etc.

The possession of immovable property, such as ground, houses, buildings and the like, belonging to Occidentals, both as individuals and business concerns or belonging to governmental institutions, was transferred by the Japanese to the "Hudoosan Kanrikoodan" established by them, which handed over the property as required to the Japanese military or civil authorities both for business as well as for personal purposes.

The same thing was done by the said Tokisan Kenribu, which body also gave away furniture, etc., of which it had the management, to Japanese individuals and officials as required.

In the sphere of ownership in respect of immovable property, drastic changes were introduced by the Japanese.

For instance, the so-called private estates (comprising vast areas, especially in the region of Batavia and Buitenzorg) were appropriated by the Military Government without the payment of any compensation to the owners. This was effected by Ordinance No. 17 of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, Java, dated 1 June 1942.

In the other islands too, such expropriations took place, as for instance in the Celebes, by virtue of an Ordinance No. 11 of the Minseifu (the Civil Administration), dated 20 March 1943.

Public utilities, even if privately owned, were seized by the Military Administration and were further operated without

payment of compensation, and in some cases were even allotted to private Japanese companies.

Private railway and tramway companies (as well as private bus companies) were amalgamated with the State Railways. Railway lines other than those of standard gauge were put out of commission; equipment which thereby became superfluous was shipped to the notorious Burma-Siam Railway. Direction of these railways was unified under the Rikuyu Sokyoku (Railway Head Office). Regardless of the fact that these railways had formerly been under different managements, all trace of former independent operation by private companies was obliterated. The personnel of these companies was pooled and Japanese rank designations and terminology were introduced.

Private or semi-governmental gas- and power- companies as well as privately owned mining concerns were taken over and operated by either the Military Government or Japanese companies.

The economic position of the Occidental community, therefore, was occupied in toto by the Japanese. The exploitation of natural resources of the East Indies by Japan had commenced.

This exploitation was partly carried on by the Military Administration itself, partly through the granting of monopolies to certain big Japanese business concerns by the Japanese Government, or by the Japanese "national policy companies" in whose capital the Japanese Government and big Japanese business participated.

Thus, the position of the Java Bank was occupied by the Southern Development Bank (Nanpo Kaihatu Ginko), a government bank whose chief function it was to finance the development and exploitation of natural resources in the Southern Regions as well as to control circulation and financing in those areas. The capital was supplied entirely by the Japanese Government. The bank was directed by the Ministry for Greater

East Asia and it acted in the Southern Regions as cashier to the Japanese Army.

The functions of private Occidental banks were taken over by Japanese banks. Here again occurred what took place in other spheres, namely that the spoils were divided in Japan. In some cases even before the war had started, but for the most part in the course of 1942 and 1943 the Japanese Government divided up natural resources in the Southern Regions between the various applicants and allotted each of them part of those areas as exploitation ground, usually according to their monopolies therein.

So, for instance, a news service monopoly in the Southern Regions was granted Domei, although a local agency had started operating first.

Press monopolies in the Southern Regions were distributed amongst various big Japanese newspaper concerns; Java, for instance was allotted to the Asahi Shimbun Sha.

In the field of banking, the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Taiwan Bank were chartered to operate in Java.

The liquidation of the Occidental banks and the introduction of Japanese banks was effected, inter alia, by compelling the bank debtors whose debts were declared to be claimable on 25th November 1942 to apply to the above-named Japanese banks for new credits backed by the securities pledged to the Western banks. The old debt was consequently paid off with the new credit.

The Java sugar industry has already been mentioned as an example of the division of the natural resources of Java amongst the big Japanese companies.

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Japanese authorities saw to it that such a complete overthrow of the existing order was accomplished that no return to the former status quo would ever be possible.

Furthermore, by forcefully carrying through the Japanization and "Fascistization" of society in the East Indies, the Japanese sought to occupy permanently the position hitherto held by the Occidental races in the Southern Regions.

After this transition period, it was already clear that Japan did not regard herself as the temporary occupant of these regions, but as permanent master. Java as well as the other islands of the East Indies were transformed into separate Japanese colonies.

In her propaganda Japan referred to herself as the "liberator", come to establish a "New Order". "New Java" was to be educated to become a worthy member of the "Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere". Japan's true intentions in regard to this Sphere will be discussed later.

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II. THE SECOND PHASE.

August 1942 to July 1943

Establishment of Japanese Rule Completed.

During the period when former authority was being destroyed, the Japanese carried on administration with a much simplified machinery. The Japanese Commander-in-Chief of Java (who incidentally reached the Bantam shores swimming as his ship was sunk in the bay of that name) was accompanied by his Chief of Staff. The latter was concurrently Chief of the Military Government (Gunseikan) and was, in this capacity, assisted by a simple "central organ" as well as by a Colonel. This Colonel was in charge of administration in territories occupied by troops which had landed in West-Java. Administration was carried on locally by Commanding Officers of occupational detachments. Another Colonel in East-Java was invested with similar authority. A third Colonel in Central-Java provisionally headed Military Administration under instructions from the Gunseikan.

Plans, originally drawn up in Tokyo, envisaged sending out parties by ship, consisting of a selection of Japanese experts in the fields of colonial administration, technical sciences, and economy, to follow immediately in the wake of the occupational troops. One party did sail, but their ship was sunk on the high seas. As a result it was not until the beginning of August 1942 that the provisional set-up was succeeded by a regular Administration.

1. Institution of an Entirely New Japanese Central Administration

After the initial period when the Military Government had been part and parcel of the Army, the Military Administration was next developed into a separate body.

The gist of its functions was laid down in Ordinance No. 1 of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, dated 7 March 1942, in which he

assumed all powers which hitherto had been exercised by the Governor-General. The article in point reads:

"Article 2. The General Officer Commanding Japanese Forces has final authority over the Military Administration, this to include all powers exercised by the Governor-General".

First a central body was set up, which at first was very simple but was expanded later on.

The Gunseikan (concurrently Chief of Staff) was in charge of this Military Administration (Gunsei). He was assisted by approximately nine Departments and four Bureaus.

After having matured during the period now under consideration, this organization only underwent slight alteration.

The following, however, is a general outline.

The Gunseikanbu (Military Administration Section) comprised the following Departments:

1. Soomubu (General Affairs Department). The Chief of this Department (Soomubutyoo) was factually in charge of the Central Administration and would deputize for the Gunseikan. Besides functioning as a Government Secretariate this Department gave guidance to the other Departments, and laid down policies.
2. Naimubu (Internal Affairs Department). This Department was split up into:
 - Tihookyoku (Local Administration Division),
 - Bunkyokyoku (Educational Division),
 - Eiseikyoku (Public Health Division),
 - Roomukyoku (Labour Division, added at a later stage).
3. Zaimubu (Finance Department).
4. Sihoobu (Justice Department).
5. Keimubu (Police Department). This Department was renamed Tianbu (Security Department) in 1944, after

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the Judge Advocate General's Office, hitherto under the Justice Department, was brought under this Department.

6. Kootenou (Public Works Department). This Department was abolished in 1945 and dissolved into four General Bureaus or Sub-Departments, viz. Sisetu Sookyoku (Public Works Bureau), Hooso Kanrikyoku (Broadcasting Control Bureau), Tuusin Sookyoku (Communications Bureau) and Jidosha Sookyoku (Motor Transport Bureau).
7. Sangyobu (Economic Affairs Department). This Department was split into two new Departments towards the end of 1943. Part became Gunzuu Seisanbu (War Equipment Production Department), part became Keizaibu (Economic Affairs Department).
8. Syuumubu (Religious Affairs Department).
9. Sendenbu (Propaganda Department).

Apart from these nine Departments a number of Bureaus came into being as time went on. These Bureaus did not have the same standing as Departments but being under the Gunseikan directly they were equally independent. They were:

1. Zoosen Kyoku (Shipbuilding Bureau).
2. Kaizi Sookyoku (Maritime Affairs Bureau).
3. Kaikei Kanto Kubu (Audition Bureau).
4. Tekisan Kanribu (Enemy Property Administration Bureau).

And again there was a number of other governmental bodies:

1. Saibai Kigyoo Rangoo Kai (Planters' Corporation).
2. Toogyo Rengoo Kai (Sugar Producers' Corporation).
3. Hudoosan Kanri Koodan (Administration of Real Estate).
4. Siryooti Kanri Koodan (Administration of Privately Owned Plantations).
5. Zuuyooobusi Kanri Koodan (Administration of Essential Commodities).

The above summary is not complete. It does, however, show that the structure of the pre-war Central Administration was changed by Japan thoroughly and in its entirety.

So far from adopting the existing organization in some form or other, the Japanese authorities substituted a wholly different Central Administration entirely modelled on the Japanese pattern.

The following instances may illustrate this point. Neither a General Affairs Department nor a Propaganda Department were in existence formerly. Police used to be under Internal Affairs Department, while Public Health, Education and Labour were handled by separate Departments or Bureaus in the pre-war establishment. Religious Affairs used to be under the Education and Religion Department.

The Government Secretariate, the Council of State for the Indies and the Governor-General's Cabinet disappeared altogether. The former Departments of general administration, corresponding in name with the new Japanese Departments (e.g. Justice Department) were reorganized along Japanese lines.

All leading positions in these Japanese Departments were occupied by Japanese. According to official Japanese information, on 1 September 1945 23,242 Japanese nationals were employed by the Military Government in Java, amounting to half the number of service personnel proper stationed there.

2. Legislative Powers.

Legislative powers in Java were laid down as follows:

Supreme legislative powers were exercised by the Imperial Government at Tokyo. Certain Ordinances issued by that Government were considered to be in force in Java without special local promulgation, as for example, the Enemy Nationals' Property Ordinance of December 1941, etc.

The Supreme Commander in South East Asia (Field Marshal Terauchi) also was invested with legislative powers. Ordinances issued by him were not published separately in Java. An instance is supplied by the "Military Law of the Southern Army" Ordinance of 9 August 1942. As a result of violation of this Ordinance, which was entirely unknown in Java, thousands have been arrested, tortured and in many cases sentenced.

Ordinances issued by the Saikoo Sikikan, Commander-in-Chief of Java (Osamu Gunritu and Osamu Seirei) and Ordinances issued by the Gunseikan (Osamu Kanrei) did see publication in that island. (The Gunseikan could issue ordinances for the execution of laws, orders and ordinances issued at a higher level).

Publication was effected in the Osamu Kan Po, an official bimonthly Gazette which appeared in a Japanese language, as well as in a Malay language, edition. Some secret Ordinances, however, appeared in the Japanese edition only.

Some bodies at lower levels were also empowered to issue ordinances. This will be taken up in connection with local administration later on. These ordinances were also published in the Kan Po.

The institution of Advisory Councils at a later stage did not affect the legislative position in any way.

3. Japanization of Local Administration.

In August 1942 preparations for the reorganization of the local administration at a lower level had been brought to a point where it could be put into effect. Again this meant a complete departure from the former system.

The new organization was published as Ordinance No. 27 issued by the Commander-in-Chief, Java, dated 5 August 1942. It laid down an entirely new system of local administration under which Java was divided into 17 "Syuu" (comparable to the former

"Residencies" which were maintained geographically). Besides, one "Tokubetu Si" ("Special City Area") comprising Batavia, was established, while the four Sultanates in Central-Java were administered by two "Kooti Zimu Kyoku" (Sultanates' Bureaus) one at Solo and one at Jogja, each Bureau being in charge of two Sultanates.

The former "Provinces" of West-, Central- and East-Java were no longer mentioned and thus disappeared. Later, in early 1945, the Commander-in-Chief, Java, instituted three "Gunseisibu", coinciding geographically with the former Provinces but entirely differing in kind, as the Commander-in-Chief pointed out in an official statement.

The various Syuu, Tokubetu Si and Kooti Zimu Kyoku came directly under the Gunseikanbu in a rigidly centralized and autocratic system, thus supplanting the former decentralized and democratic variety of autonomy in local administration.

As has been pointed out previously, local councils, having budgetary powers among others, had already disappeared in March 1942. No such councils were mentioned in the Ordinance, and popular participation in local administration had come to an end.

The Syuu were subdivided into 3 to 5 Ken (each coinciding geographically with the former "Regencies") and a small number of Si (coinciding with former town municipalities). The Ken again were subdivided in Gun (former "Districts"), the Gun in Son (former "Sub-Districts") and the Son in Ku (former "desas"). The Si (municipalities) were subdivided in Siku (wards).

This Japanization, however, did not mean the end of reorganization. The very nature of the system was still to be affected. In the course of the period now under consideration the organic laws governing the functions of administrative bodies under the old system were abolished by Ordinance and substituted by Japanese regulations, on which the centralized and autocratic nature of the new administration was based.

The position of the Syuutyoo (comparable to the former "Resident"), the Kentyoo (comparable to the former "Regent") and Sityoo (former "Burgomaster") were, on one hand, considerably strengthened, on the other hand made far more dependent on the Central Administration. The Fuehrer-principle was introduced by leaving these officials a large measure of liberty in the execution of their duties; they were given powers of dismissal and appointment, and penal powers over their staff, little restricted by the right of appeal or previous approval by superiors; they were no longer responsible to a Council, but only to their superiors. Again they were subject to the autocratic authority of these superiors and were held responsible to them even where they were not in fact responsible.

They were empowered to issue regulations to implement ordinances promulgated by higher authority and also regulations concerning matters not yet covered by such ordinances.

Summing up the position, they were but a cog in the machinery of a police state.

It can therefore be said correctly that the democratic and decentralized administration, aimed at self-government, which existed in 1941, had been supplanted by the Japanese with an autocratic and centralized administration, coupled with the introduction of the Fuehrer-principle. According to statements by Japanese Syuutyoo and similar authorities, the object the Japanese had in mind was to build up an administration which in its final form should be on the same lines as those followed in their colonies in Formosa and Korea.

The position of the four Javanese Sultans also underwent fundamental change. The four ruling Sultans were maintained, not, as a matter of principle, as having a hereditary title to their position, but as Rulers, under the name of Ko, newly invested by the Japanese. They were made to swear allegiance to the Japanese Army in the same way as all civilian officials in the

Japanese Administration. Early in August 1942 their investiture and swearing-in took place in Batavia at the residence of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief.

4. Japanization of the Administration's Personnel.

All key-positions in the new establishment were occupied by Japanese. From the Gunseikan down to the Syuu Office, the staff was almost entirely Japanese. From the Ken Office downward, the Indonesian staff was almost wholly maintained. The kentyoo, however (comparable to the former "Regent"), was, from 1944 onward, assisted by a Japanese adviser. As has been observed before, Indonesian officials were designated under the Japanese names for their appointments. The former Regent became a Kentyoo (Chief of a Ken), the former Burgomaster a Sityoo (Chief of a town), etc.

The composition of the Administrative Corps underwent some modifications at later stages as a result of Prime Minister Tojo's promises. These modifications, however, were more in appearance than in fact. Leading positions remained in the hands of Japanese; if an Indonesian held a seemingly important post there was certain to be a Japanese in the background who was the leading executive.

It was not until the end of August 1945 that Japanese officials handed over actual authority to their Indonesian colleagues. The former withdrew, apparently indifferent to the chaos that ensued.

Biographies of those Japanese civil officers, holding military rank, whose installation took place in August 1942, as published by the propaganda service, show that this corps was assembled chiefly in colonial Formosa and Korea, while the remainder had been engaged in administrative functions in Japan proper.

5. Japanization of Administration in the other Islands in the East Indies.

After all that has been said about Java, it may suffice to state that the establishment of a new administrative system in the other islands developed along the same lines.

In Sumatra, like Java occupied by the Army, the same structure is found as in Java. There was a Gunseikan who first resided at Singapore and later at Fort de Kock (Sumatra). The island was divided into Syuu; at lower levels there were differences compared with Java in designations, not in nature.

In the initial stage, Sumatra along with Malaya formed an administrative unit under an Army Commander at Singapore. Later these two areas were divided again, when Sumatra was placed under a separate Gunseikanbu, residing at Fort de Kock (renamed Bukit Tinggi).

The 16th and 25th Armies (Java and Sumatra respectively) came under the 7th Area Army with Headquarters at Singapore, commanded in the final stages by Itagaki, Seishiro. This 7th Area Army came under the Southern Theatre with Headquarters first at Singapore and later near Saigon, commanded by Field Marshal Terauchi.

The chains of command in regard to the Military Administrations were more or less parallel; however, the Ministry of War also dealt directly with the Gunseikanbu in Java and in Sumatra, respectively.

In the Celebes, Borneo and all islands east of a line running north and south through Bali and Macassar Straits the Japanese Navy was in power. Again the terminology varied, but the system was not different in essence. The same principles of centralization and autocratic administration were applied. Relations between Japanese and Indonesian officials were the same; only the fact that these islands are generally less progressive tended to make the gap between the two groups even wider.

Administration in territory under Naval Occupation was not termed Gunsei (Military Government) but Minsei (Civil Government). It nonetheless had all the characteristics of a central autocratic administration exercised by a Service over civilians.

The Minsei was executed by the Minseifu (Headquarters) at Macassar (Celebes). At the establishment in its final form in early 1943, this Minseifu was subdivided into four Minseibu, one in the Celebes, one in Borneo, one in Ceram and one in Bali and Lombok.

The Minseifu at Macassar was under the command of the Officer Commanding the Second Southern Squadron, whose Headquarters was at Sourabaya. This Headquarters fell under the Officer Commanding the 7th Southern Squadron at Singapore. A Liaison Office between Navy and Army was operating at Batavia for the purpose of effecting liaison for the Java area. This "Bukanfu" commanded by Rear-Admiral, later Vice-Admiral, Maeda will be discussed later.

6. Japanization of the Judicial System.

Parallel to the reorganization of the Administration, the Judicial System was entirely converted and "japanized" during this period of the final establishment of Japanese rule.

As has been discussed apropos of the transitional period, the Japanese Commander-in-Chief of Java in April 1942 abolished all existing Courts and instituted Gunsei Hoo'in (Courts of the Military Administration).

Besides, there were two other types of courts, viz.

Gun Kaigi, a Court Martial proper, which tried Japanese service personnel and those who, according to Japanese law, were subject to trial by Court Martial, e.g., Prisoners of War in certain cases.

Gunritu Kaigi, a Court Martial trying violations of the Gunritu (Army Ordinances).

The Gunsei Hooiin were charged with trying violations of Military Government Ordinances and Regulations, as well as those former Ordinances which had been declared in force by this Government.

The Gunritu Kaigi also tried this type of offences if this Kaigi itself or the District Attorney (Kensatukan) deemed it necessary.

Ordinance No. 14, issued by the Commander-in-Chief, Java, dated 26 September 1942, gave the Gunsei Hooiin their final form. They were differentiated into eight levels and types, viz

Saikoo Hooiin, a sort of Supreme Court or Final Court of Appeal comprising Japanese members.

Kootoo Hooiin (High Courts or Intermediary Courts of Appeal) there were three of these in Batavia, Semarang and Sourabaya respectively, and they were comparable to their counterparts under the former system; but had an entirely different jurisdiction. They comprised Japanese members.

Tihoo Hooiin (District Courts); had a wider jurisdiction than their former counterparts.

Keizai Hooiin (Police Courts); had roughly the same jurisdiction as their former counterparts.

Ken Hooiin (County Courts); comparable to their former counterparts.

Gun Hooiin (Sub-County Courts); had roughly the same jurisdiction as their former counterparts.

Kaikyoo Kootoo Hooiin; comparable to the former Courts for Mohammedan Affairs.

Sooryoo Hooiin; comparable to the former Priest Courts.

Down to the Kootoo Hooin (High Courts), these Courts originally comprised Japanese members only; lower courts were left in Indonesian hands. The Kootoo Hooin were especially charged with exercising control over these lower courts.

The existing system of prosecution was also converted; to each hooin or court a Kensatu-kyoku (Prosecution Section) was attached. This system was strongly centralized, and at a later stage it was even detached altogether from the Justice Department, in the same way as the police force was detached from the Internal Affairs Department, Prosecution and Police were jointly brought under the Police Department which for this purpose was renamed Public Security Department (Tianbu), and which came directly under the Gunseikanbu.

In criminal courts with Indonesian members a representative of the Kempei attended the sessions, seated next to the representative of the Kensatu-kyoku (Prosecution Section), thereby exercising supervision over the Indonesian members as well as over the Indonesian prosecutor.

In the initial stages the former Penal Code was maintained. As soon, however, as the Japanese authorities had gained a closer grip on local conditions, it was decided that this criminal law was based on excessively democratic foundations. A new Penal Code was therefore introduced in 1944, in which criminal acts were defined in vague terms, deliberately leaving wide scope for interpretation. This, needless to say, left the door open for arbitrary convictions. High minima of punishment were introduced for special offences; formerly for all classes of offences there existed a general minimum fine of one guilder or detention for one day, vesting wide discretionary powers in the judge.

Even more serious was the fact that considerably lower standards were introduced in regard to the admissibility of evidence in criminal cases, which made possible convictions on

the mere statement of a co-defendant or on a confession by the accused (at the Kempei).

The methods by which the Kempei forced its victims to confess have been under discussion before. In view of these methods, it is evident that the admission of a confession secured by the Kempei as valid proof of guilt seriously jeopardized safeguards for the proper administration of justice.

It is worthy of note that during the Japanese occupation interference by the Japanese Administration occurred frequently in trials by Indonesian courts. In practice, for instance, it was the Kempei representative, attending the session, who determined the sentence. During the session only Japanese and Malay languages were allowed.

Trials by the Courts Martial proper were conducted in Japanese; proper interpretation was seldom available.

In the other islands of the East Indies judicial powers were administered in the same manner. Former courts were abolished and new Japanese courts established.

The final form was given to this japanization in Sumatra by an Ordinance of the Commander-in-Chief, Sumatra, dated 1 January 1944.

In territories occupied by the Navy the same change was brought about by Minseihurei (Ordinance of the Civil Government) No. 26, published by the Nanseihoomen Kaigun Minseihu (Civil Government of the Southern Area Naval Command) on 1 November 1943.

2. Japanization of the Police Force.

The police organization in Java was one of the first objects that came in for japanization. Naturally the Japanese desired to secure a close grip on and to influence decisively this instrument of power.

At the very outset of the occupation the Japanese authorities took over the Police School at Sukabumi, Java, in order to ensure Japanese influence over the training of police personnel. Also in the capitals of the various Syuu, permanent courses for the training of police personnel, led by Japanese, were established. Finally propaganda courses for personnel already in the service were conducted regularly, in order to imbue them with the Greater East Asia ideals and to impress them with Japan's might. As a result of this propaganda the police force soon changed in outlook and behaviour. The Japanese system of corporal maltreatment, administered on the spot or at the police station, for the settlement of a minor infraction and thereby sidestepping further legal procedure, was introduced. Maltreatment as a punishment for insignificant offences could be witnessed daily in the streets. The legally powerless position of the population was thereby clearly demonstrated. On the other hand, of course, there was a decline in criminal statistics. Moral standards of the Police Force were seriously shaken by this training. Examples set by the Kempei in the maltreatment of defenseless suspects were emulated by a certain section of the Indonesian Police Force.

The interest taken by Japanese in the Force was also demonstrated by their establishment of a separate Police Department, later the Public Security Department.

The police organization was modified along more autocratic lines and all executive functions were taken over by the Japanese. The service cap was fitted out with the Japanese flag. Japanese rank designations were enforced.

The existing Force, however, was felt to be insufficient by the Japanese authorities. Various ways to remedy this situation were attempted.

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A Kempeihoo was organized. This Kempeihoo, an Indonesian extension of the Kempai, was chiefly engaged in spying activities. They were trained by Kempai personnel in Kempai methods, and were both feared and hated by the population.

At an earlier stage, in April 1943, a Keiboodan (a sort of Village Guards) was organized by Order of the Commander-in-Chief. Intended as a sort of auxiliary police force, it was organized in all Ku (villages) and Siku (municipalities). This meant a reinforcement for the regular police by a body approximately 1,300,000 strong. The ears and the eyes of the police were multiplied a hundredfold as the Keiboodan also was chiefly engaged in espionage.

The Keiboodan had a variety of duties. It had to go into action in case of fire or other calamities, it had to assist the regular police in apprehensions, as in the case of crashed allied air crews, did 24-hour guard duties in its area, turned out in force during public propaganda meetings in order to fill gaps, etc. Yet its duty consisted, inter alia, of spying, chiefly in a general campaign against enemy spies. As this campaign increased in intensity, it tended to make the simple farmer (most members of the Keiboodan were farmers) indulge more and more in their age-old country-born suspicion of any and every stranger to their village.

At a later stage, the Keiboodan were trained for action against enemy paratroops as well as in air raid precautions.

Still later, in 1945, these Keiboodan were used as the intermediary through which the Japanese made their campaign for the training of the population in guerilla action penetrate to every village. This training was aimed at cutting lines of communication, destruction of small enemy detachments, etc., through massed action of a whole village, for which purpose the only armament at their disposal consisted of bamboo spears and bolo-knives. This training of simple farmers of low intelligence,

entailing as it did instilling fear of foreigners and hate for Occidentals has led to barbarous displays of cruelty towards those "foreigners."

Other duties of the Keiboodan consisted of guarding the coast and the prevention of smuggling.

Finally a third body, also an auxiliary force to the police, was set up early in 1945, and called Keibootai.

This Keibootai operated in towns only, but otherwise served the same purposes as the Keiboodan. Its members were recruited chiefly from among the Chinese community.

The Kempeihoo can be compared to the Heiho units (auxiliary military units), which will come under discussion later. It was part of the Kempei and therefore of the Army.

Both the Keiboodan and the Keibootai, on the other hand, although Japanese-led, and Japanese-trained, formed no part of the official Army organization. They were "volunteers"; it is, however, to be noted that if the required numbers were not filled, the remainder was drafted. Both local Keiboodan and Keibootai came under the Kutuyoo (village chief) or Sikutyoo (ward chief) in the chain of command. They had rotating duties during part of the week.

With all these auxiliary organizations, the regular police were considerably reinforced and Japanized.

The prison system was similarly reorganized under Japanese instructions. Courses were held for the training of newly recruited personnel as well as for the "improvement" of personnel with previous service. Japanese designations and Japanese markings were introduced. Equally deplorable results in the inhumane treatment of prisoners were scored here.

8. Japanization of Education.

It has been noted in the previous Phase that the Japanese authorities prohibited every form of education in the initial

stage. As soon as the Military Government could cope with the situation, it proceeded to lay down a revised educational program with a view to reopening schools for Indonesians. All Occidental and democratic ideas had been eradicated in this new program.

First of all, elementary education in the People's Schools was revised. Instruction in the Japanese language as well as in Japanese songs and Japanese dances was introduced. Much time was spent on the Japanese type of physical training. The remainder of the curriculum, instruction in reading and mathematics, was seriously encroached upon.

The several types of intermediate schools, with their ample variety of curricula, were abolished to make place for one standard type of intermediate school with one, uniform curriculum. This school was divided into a First and a Higher. Compared with former standards the curriculum was very much simplified; foreign languages and general history being dropped to make place for Japanese language and Japanese history. Textbooks on the history of the islands were burnt and a new textbook was introduced instead, which was to emphasize racial affinities and ties of common destiny with Japan.

An entirely new subject was the instruction in "Seisin" (Japanese for Spirit), purporting to instil Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere ideals in the younger generation. Typical of this Seisin-propaganda was one of the maxims propounded, viz. that the Spirit should be able to overcome all material obstacles. In this vein youngsters were exhorted to fight tanks and other modern weapons, with bamboo spears if necessary. As an example the story was told, and circulated throughout the Malay press, of a Japanese fighter pilot who, having been attacked over New Guinea by two enemy fighters, shot down one and ran out of ammunition; he then proceeded to put the second enemy fighter out of action by destroying the latter's propeller, which he did by throwing rice-cakes.

Vocational schools were reorganized to conform with Japanese conceptions.

University education suffered most. Only Batavia Medical College was reopened. On 9 March 1943, commemoration day of the "Foundation of New Java", it was reinstated under the name of Ika Daigaku. Its first president was a Japanese professor, assisted by nine newly appointed Indonesian professors, most of them former associate professors at that College. Six months later, these nine Indonesian professors were demoted back to associate professors and succeeded by Japanese professors, new arrivals from Japan, who proceeded to lecture in Japanese. Instruction in the Japanese language had been obligatory from the outset.

Life for the students underwent a thorough change. Those admitted to this College pledged themselves to entry into Japanese Military Government service after graduation. Students were billeted and were subject to a strict and semi-military regimentation. They were in the charge of specially appointed Japanese, who, in daily lectures, were to acquaint them with the greatness of Japan and the ideals of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. Here again instruction in "Semangat" played a great part.

The curriculum of the Medical College was limited; the complete course, formerly six years, was reduced to four.

The Literary, Law and Technical Colleges were not reopened. However, in 1944, again on 9 March, a sort of higher vocational school with a limited program covering three years was opened. Students were subjected to the same routine.

Law College was later supplanted by courses for the training of civilian officials and lawyers. These courses covered one year as against four or five years formerly. Limitations in the program were aggravated by the fact that so much time was spent on instruction in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity

Vocational schools were reorganized to conform with Japanese conceptions.

University education suffered most. Only Batavia Medical College was reopened. On 9 March 1943, commemoration day of the "Foundation of New Java", it was reinstated under the name of Ika Daigaku. Its first president was a Japanese professor, assisted by nine newly appointed Indonesian professors, most of them former associate professors at that College. Six months later, these nine Indonesian professors were demoted back to associate professors and succeeded by Japanese professors, new arrivals from Japan, who proceeded to lecture in Japanese. Instruction in the Japanese language had been obligatory from the outset.

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Sphere ideals and the greatness of Japan. Same regimentation of students was in force. These courses were planned entirely with a view to useful coordination of future civilian officials and lawyers with the Japanese Military Government. The Law course was divided into courses for judges, prosecutors and recorders. Instruction in the Japanese Language played an important part.

Private education remained taboo for a long time. Only when it became necessary to make concessions to those Indonesians whose cooperation was required, were certain former private schools allowed to reorganize themselves. The curriculum, however, was not allowed to deviate in any way from the official program.

Later, when Chinese cooperation was sought, some private Chinese schools were granted permission to reopen under the same restrictions.

Occidental education as well as tuition to Occidentals were prohibited throughout the occupation, with the exception of a small school for German children at a hill station. This prohibition was strictly enforced; the mere suspicion of having given tuition to Occidentals was sufficient to involve the suspect with the Kempei.

The Japanese also sought to gain influence over Indonesian college students by sending a considerable number of them to Japan from Java as well as from the other islands. Not only college students, however, were sent out, but also graduates and other prominent personalities from among the Indonesian community. A party of some twenty leading Indonesians, for example, made a two weeks tour through Japan in the autumn of 1943; on return they were to sing the praise of Japan's greatness and might. A party of journalists from all the islands were brought to Japan about the same time in order to attend the Greater East Asia Journalists' Conference.

In the entire field of education the Japanese took care to prevent Occidental and democratic ideas from reaching students, and to bring them under the influence of Greater East Asia ideals.

2. "Fascistization" and Japanization of Society.

The final establishment of Japanese rule brought about a reorganization of all sections of society into corporations along fascist lines.

The Japanese in this way did not only aim at controlling all phases of social expression but also to make use of these corporations for other purposes; general support, support in the particular field of activities of a given corporation, propaganda, and, last but not least spying activities.

Those who were engaged in any official capacity were considered to be sufficiently under control as outlined above; but closer ties were sought to bind the so-called free society for purposes of exploitation in the interests of Japan.

It should be borne in mind that all gatherings and meetings, apart from the enumerated exceptions, were prohibited. This prohibition remained in force regarding all organizations and meetings except those sponsored by official authority.

The fascistic organization and political coordination of the so-called free society was carried out among all racial and political groups as well as among:

- a. practically all professions and trades.
- b. practically all economic sections of society.
- c. all cultural groups
- d. all religious groups
- e. the younger generation
- f. sports organizations
- g. women's movements

In this way the audience for the propaganda machine was multiplied by ten, just as the police force had been multiplied a hundred fold by the Keiboodan. These organizations served many purposes. In the first place the Japanese authorities kept a close grip on a particular social group through the organization and were in a position to command aid and support on the part of its members for the Army or the Military Government. Besides, the corporation could be required regularly to turn out in force during mass meetings. It also supplied the Japanese with an opportunity for disseminating propaganda among its members; the usual "courses" (in "Seisin" to cite one example) were held for them. Finally, the Japanese remained in control of public opinion, while on the other hand these corporations were used to keep abreast of true public opinion and to conduct espionage.

It is evident that the Propaganda Department maintained close relations with these organizations. Addresses by Indonesian officials in these organizations were not only pre-censored, but were usually even drafted by the Department. Generally, they were under close and strict supervision by the Gunseikanbu.

The Italian conception of fascist corporations was freely borrowed from. The various sections of society were organized in corporations, all serving uniform purposes and all modeled on the same lines. Corporations were instituted by Ordinances issued by the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, Java. Article I of these Ordinances read the same for practically all corporations. It stated the establishment of the corporation and its objectives, viz. support to the Japanese Military Government for the glory of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

The appointment of the executives in these corporations was regulated by the same Ordinance; in fact they were always Japanese, appointed officially, even if in some cases it was made to appear as if Indonesians were in charge. Usually, there

was a chief executive appointed by the Gunseikanbu and assisted by an advisory council appointed by, or with the approval of, the Gunseikanbu. Local branches were led by an executive appointed by, or with the approval of, the local Syuntuyoo, and assisted by a similarly constituted advisory council. Here again we see a rigid centralization coupled with an autocratic form of authority.

The executive body within a corporation was authorized to lay down regulations binding upon its members; membership was obligatory for all within a given group.

The fascistic organization and streamlining of various racial sections of the population and of political activities will come under consideration in the next Phase.

3. Political Coordination and Fascistic Organization of Professions and Trades.

A clear case in point is provided by the fascistic organization of physicians, dentists and dispensers in the Java Izi Hookookai (Corporation for the Public Service by Medical Men in Java), established by Ordinance (Osarusoirei) No. 28, of the Commander-in-Chief in Java, dated 3 August 1943. The relevant articles read as follows:

"Article 1.: The Java Izi Hookookai is established with the purpose of coordinating those engaged in the field of medicine in Java, to train their knowledge and character and to broaden and raise their capability in curing, and the care for sanitation, so that in this way they can give their contribution to the utmost to the Dai Nippon Army in medical affairs.

"Article 4.: Physicians, dentists and medical experts in Java, who are not Japanese nationals, must become a member of the Izi Hookookai, except enemy nationals.

- "Article 8.: Besides what has been mentioned in Article 7, the Izi Hookookai carries out special work necessary for conducting the Military Government at the order of the Gunseikan.
- "Article 9.: The Head of the Izi Hookookai can issue orders and instructions necessary for carrying out the work stipulated in Articles 7 and 8 to the members after obtaining approval from the Gunseikan.
- "Article 21.: The Izi Hookookai is supervised by the Gunseikan. The work of the branch officers is supervised by the Syuutyookan (Japanese Local Governor)."

The lawyers were brought under a streamlined organization, called the Nippon Hoken Kyookai, established in December 1942.

All newspaper men were organized in the Jawa Simbun Kai, established in August 1942. All Malay and Japanese newspapers and newspaper men as well as the Domei News Agency were brought together in this corporation. The latter was not only controlling papers, journalists and general publications, but it also allocated paper, ink and other essential materials.

The Japanese thus controlled the Press in three ways: papers were published by Japanese companies, all journalistic activities were controlled by the Jawa Simbun Kai and, finally, censorship was imposed.

In Java harbours, lighter owners and operators were organized in the Jawa Hansen Kumiai, established in June 1942.

The few remaining private transportation enterprises and their staffs were organized in the Jawa Ryokiyaku Unso Zigyo Kumiai in March 1943. As all private railway, tramway and bus companies had been taken over and were operated by the State Railways, this organization, therefore, included only operators of bullock carts and tricycles. These examples of corporations are not exhaustive.

b. Corporations in the Economic Field.

In the field of economic activities the same picture is observed, showing obligatory membership, unilaterally binding regulations, uniform objects and Japanese executives.

Examples:

Beikoku Onosisyo Kumiai, the Corporation of Wholesale Rice Dealers, founded in September 1942.

Beikoku Kouri Kumiai, the Corporation of Retail Rice Dealers, founded in September 1942.

Orimono Koogyo Kumiai, the Corporation of Textile Producers, founded in July 1943.

Jawa Satoo Hambai Rangoo Kumiai, United Corporation of Sugar Merchants in Java.

Tojo Yusan Kai, the Corporation for Industrial Development, (in aid of the war industries), named after Prime Minister Tojo, as it was established on Tojo's instigation during his visit to Java in July 1943.

Sinsaku Syorai Kai, Corporation for the Guidance of Domestic Industries, founded August 1943.

Beikoku Zusan Kyosin Kai, Corporation for Increased Agricultural Production, founded September 1943.

Warong Kumiai Rengookai, United Corporation of Retail Shop Keepers, founded August 1943.

Kigoo Tosei Kai, the Corporation for the Development of the Weaving Industry.

(Note: This list is also incomplete).

c. Cultural Organizations.

All artists and scholars were organized in the Keimin Bunko Sidosya. This field of activities being of particular interest to the Japanese propaganda, much attention was paid this organi-

zation. The importance of a truly Oriental artistic expression was emphasized. Occidental influences were considered inimical. Paintings and other artistic expressions were adjudged, not on their artistic value, but solely on their merits in relation to the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. This organization, established in March 1943, showed the same characteristics as the other corporations: Japanese executives, obligatory support to the Army and the Military Government, etc.

Actors were detailed by the corporation to accompany tours organized by the propaganda service in order to draw larger audiences.

The allocation of materials was again in the hands of this official body.

d. Religious Organizations.

This subject will be discussed in the next Phase.

e. Japanization and Militaristic and Fascistic Training of Youth

The Youth Movement was similarly brought into fascist line. The Japanese attached such importance to the spiritual moulding of youth that they took the matter into their own hands completely. The Indonesian Youth Movement, which at the outset had been authorized, was prohibited in the middle of 1943.

As early as December 1942 the Japanese Commander-in-Chief in Java declared that the training of the younger generation to be good citizens of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere was of such paramount importance that the best Japan had to offer was not considered good enough. Only subsequent application of these expressions was to reveal their true meaning: the guidance and training of youth was to be an exclusively Japanese concern. This object was achieved through the establishment in April 1943 of the Jawa Seinendan (Java Youth Corps).

Its aims were laid down as follows:

"In order to convince the youth of Java so that they will energetically cooperate with the Military Government and render assistance in the building up of the Co-prosperity Sphere in Greater East Asia, it is necessary that they be given guidance and training."

In every Syuu Residency a Japanese Training Centre for local instructors was established, while for the training of graded instructors the Tyuuoo Seinen Kunrensyo (Central Youth Training Camp) was opened near Batavia. The direction and training in these camps were entirely in Japanese hands.

When the training of these future instructors was sufficiently advanced, a Seinendan (Youth Corps) was organized in every Ken (Regency) and Si (town), each approximately at battalion strength. Some factories had their own Seinendan.

The various Seinendan were organized in the Jawa Rengoo Seinendan, (United Youth Corps of Java) on military lines and with Japanese officers.

Age limits were set at 14 to 25 and if insufficient volunteers were forthcoming more were drafted. Only the physically fit were admitted and these were tested as to their enthusiasm for the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

Dantyo (Corps Commander) of the entire Jawa Rengoo Seinendan was the Gunseikan; Soomubutyoo (the Chief General Affairs Department); and Naimubutyoo (the Chief Internal Affairs Department) were made Hukudantyo (Deputy Corps Commanders).

The official training comprised instruction in the Japanese language, spiritual and military training, Japanese physical training, air raid precautions, Japanese music and dances, etc. The requirements for Japanese language were: conversational Japanese and katakana writing.

The Seinendan largely supplied the manpower for the Booei Giyu Gun (Defence Volunteers Corps), which was organized in September 1943.

Through a constant flux in membership, training and ideological processing of the largest possible number of physically fit youths was achieved.

Needless to say, the Seinendan was also used for propaganda, checking of public opinion and spying.

Soon after its establishment all other youth organizations were prohibited.

f. Coordination of Sports.

Sports were also brought in line. On 21 August 1943 the Tai Iku Kai was organized after some attempts to bring about the desired streamlining from within had failed.

The Tai Iku Kai provides the same picture as other corporations. In the official explanation of the applicable Ordinance it said: "The Jawa Tai Iku Kai will cover the sports-world of all Greater East Asiatic nationals in Java, from office-employees to school-children, and also that of the Keiboodan and the Seinendan. Considering how important sports is for our spiritual and corporal training, for learning and developing discipline, and for strengthening the spirit and the determination to work, this Tai Iku Kai is of great importance to the War of Greater East Asia."

In every Ken and Si a branch was established; these branches were organized in their respective Syuu and these again were all subordinated to the Jawa Iku Kai.

g. Political Coordination of Women's Movements.

The Indonesian women of Java were organized in the Huzin Kai, founded in August 1943. The internal organization was parallel to the Tai Iku Kai. Kentyoo and Sityoo were ex officio Meiyo Kaityoo (honorary presidents of local branches), while their wives were the Kaityoo (heads).

Objects and duties were laid down as follows:

"The purpose of this organization is to help the Dai Nippon Army with efforts befitting the position of the women of the original inhabitants and also to raise the women's virtue. (Note: At that time the Japanese did not yet permit use of the word 'Indonesian', and themselves used the expression 'original inhabitant').

In order to assist in the conduct of the Military Government, the Zigyobu (Working Section), is created within the Hujin Kai; this body has to carry out work necessary for the improvement of conditions behind the front-line and in the field of savings, education, public safety and public health.

In order to deepen the conviction of women in their duties towards the efforts of the defence of the country in wartime, in the first place to give instruction in first aid, the Hujin Kai shall be allowed to organize lecture meetings and courses and to establish a close contact with the Seinendan and Keiboodan in conducting exercises so that in future when there is an enemy attack the work can be done as well as possible."

Thus the women had been organized for the support of the Japanese Military Government. At the same time an instrument had been created to make the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere propaganda reach all women.

10. The Other Islands.

Developments in the other islands, were roughly parallel to those in Java. However, the Japanese living among less advanced peoples, with a lower standard of efficiency among their own Japanese personnel, and at the same time less dependent on the cooperation of the local population than they were in Java, their chief granary and supply base, they tackled the process of political coordination more sketchily.

11. Towards the middle of 1943 the final establishment of Japanese rule and the incorporation of the East Indies Archipelago within the Empire was practically completed. The peoples in these islands were absolutely isolated from the rest of the world. Among them only the trumpets of Japanese propaganda were heard. Occidental and democratic influence had been expelled. All expressions of society were supervised and controlled by Japanese authority. Life itself had been forced into rigid moulds for the support of the Japanese Army.

The widely-feared Kempeitai with its many henchmen, saw to it that there should be no deviation from the path indicated by the Japanese.

III. THE THIRD PHASE

Approximately from July 1942 until September 1944.

The Fascistic Organization of the various sections of the population, and of political and religious activities.

Japan's Policy of Easy Promises.

This Phase was characterized, on one hand, by the promises made by the Japanese Government in an effort to win over the Indonesian population; on the other hand, by the control over political and other movements obtained through fascist organization, such movements being promoted partly through the exploitation of those promises by Japanese propaganda.

1. Early Political Developments.

first

As early as in the period of time discussed in the first and second phases, there was some activity by the Japanese authorities in the political field. The policy then adopted locally was, however, - as the Naval Liaison Officer of the Commander-in-Chief at Batavia characterize it - a policy of "wait and see".

Mention has already been made of how, immediately after the occupation, the Japanese Government prohibited all political activity. This prohibition was laid down in Art. 2 of Ordinance No. 2 of the Commander-in-Chief, Java, dated 8 March 1942, and read as follows:

"Until further notice it shall be strictly prohibited to

"commit the following acts:

"a. participation in any organization; attending any

" meetings; conducting propaganda in favour of the enemy;

" the posting of printed or illustrated placards."

By Ordinance No. 3, dated 20 March 1942, it was further prohibited to "discuss" engage in activities, encourage, or make propaganda concerning the organization and structure of the Government".

By virtue of these prohibitions certain Indonesian nationalist leaders were arrested by the Kempai (Japanese Military

Police) in April 1942, some of whom were only released much later.

In December 1942 to January 1943 a large scale rounding-up was conducted of those Indonesians who had engaged in any underground activities of a kind that might possibly be construed as being anti-Japanese. They were - except for those who had been sentenced to death or had died in prisons - not released until September 1945.

Even after January 1943, the Kempeitai scrupulously continued to guard against and spy upon all underground activity, which cost a very large number of victims.

On the other hand, the Japanese propaganda service immediately sought contact with elements that were dissatisfied with the Netherlands Indies Rule.

For this purpose the Japanese initiated the "AAA" Movement. This name was announced on big placards displaying the following slogans:

Nippon Pelindung Asia (Japan the Protector of Asia)

Nippon Pemimpin Asia (Japan the Leader of Asia)

Nippon Cahaya Asia (Japan the Light of Asia)

The AAA for Asia were printed larger and in a more striking colour than the other letters; consequently the name: the AAA Movement. The theme which this movement elaborated was characterized by the slogan "Asia for the Asiatics". Hate was incited against "foreigners belonging to the white race" and against the "Western exploiters". The Japanese on the contrary, were assumed to be of the same race and stock as the Indonesians. Thus, Art. 1 of Ordinance No. 1 of the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Forces, dated 7 March 1942, read "The Japanese forces, desirous of promoting the welfare of the Indonesian people who have the same ancestors and are of the same race as the Japanese, and at the same time striving for a firm foundation for co-existence and co-prosperity for the whole population in accordance with the principle of the common defence of Greater Asia, provisionally set up a Military Government in the occupied territor-

ics, in order to stabilize law and order, and to enable the inhabitants to live peaceful lives under stabilized conditions". Western influence was represented as being a corruption of the Eastern soul; Japan was represented as the Saviour of Asiatic peoples; the Co-Prosperity Sphere of Greater East Asia under the "paternal" leadership of Japan was represented as liberating the Asiatic peoples. The right and greatness of Japan was snug in every key.

What this Sphere would mean to Java was not clarified. Apart from the slogan "New Java" or "a New Order in Java", the implications of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere were not defined. This official silence left room for any interpretation and speculation. Japan guarded against being more explicit about her "disinterestedness".

Use of the word "Indonesia" in a political sense was not permitted. In most official publications the Indonesians were referred to as "the original inhabitants".

While the A.M.M. Movement was in full swing, further contact was sought with the Indonesian world, and especially with those who had in the past shown themselves dissatisfied with the former rule and the rate at which that rule prepared for independence.

Chief among these was Sukarno (an engineer), who was brought over from Sumatra to Java by the Kemppei in July 1942. With three other nationalists he formed the so-called "Ampat Serangkai" (four-leaved clover), who became the leaders, under Japanese supervision, of those among the nationalists who were prepared to cooperate with Japan.

The four Serangkai saw in the Japanese promises a means of attaining the early independence for which they were striving. They believed in these promises and advocated complete cooperation with the Japanese Military Government in the hope of thereby achieving their own ends.

The Japanese also sought to approach the group of Indonesian intellectuals who harboured no discontent with the former rule

and, on the contrary, had held high office thereunder. For that purpose the Japanese Commander-in-Chief set up, in December 1942, the 'Kyuukun Seido Tyooso Iinkai' (Committee for the Study of former Customs and Political Systems): "in order to survey and study the customs and the former governmental systems of the country, and to contribute to wards the Administration of Java". Nine Japanese sat on this Committee under the chairmanship of Kyuziro Hayasi, one of the civil advisers to the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, and formerly President of the Nanyo Kyokai (Society for the Study of the Southern Regions): the other civil adviser, Count Hideo Kodama, member of the House of Peers, did not sit on this Committee. Also, ten Indonesians, amongst whom the said "Four-leaved Clover" represented the People's Movement, while the other Indonesians were former Chiefs of the Departments, professors and prominent personalities in the former People's Council.

This Committee, which never played an important part, was abolished by the Japanese when, in November 1943, the Tyuuko Sangi-In (Central Advisory Council) was instituted.

The first request to the Japanese authorities made by the "Four Serangkai" was to be allowed to form a party. This request was long under consideration, until, on 8 December 1942, at the commemoration of the first anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbour, a big propaganda meeting was held in Batavia, at which meeting the Commander-in-Chief publicly promised that a single party for Indonesians only would be permitted.

Originally, its formation was promised for about 1 January; but, as appeared later, this promise was not kept, pending consent being obtained from Tokyo. When that permission came, another special day of commemoration was awaited, this time 9 March 1943, the anniversary of the conquest of Java and of the foundation of "New Java".

2. The Political Coordination of the Indonesian Group.

On 9 March 1943 the "Putera" Movement was created. Its name

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was derived from a symbolic abbreviation of "Pusat Tenaga Rakyat" denoting "Center of the People's Spiritual Power", while "Putera" means "knight's son".

The way in which this people's movement was instituted, its aims and policy were approximately similar to those of the previously discussed corporations on the Italian fascist model, except that the name of this people's movement was not Japanese, but Malay. The Putera was not an association or a party, but, on the contrary, only a "movement" of the fascist type with leaders and advisory councils.

The leaders were appointed by the Commander-in-Chief: they were Suckarno with the three other Serengkel as assistants, controlled by an advisory council in which there were approximately equal numbers of Japanese and Indonesians, the latter being nominated by the leader with the approval of the Gunseikan. Local leaders were appointed by the Leader, with the approval of the local Syuutyookan (Resident).

The organization of the Putera was governed by rules laid down by the Commander-in-Chief.

The aims of the Putera were described in an address by the Soomubutyoo (Chief of the General Affairs Department), Moitiro Yamamoto, as follows:

"The object in arousing the strength and efforts of the people is no other than to support all measures for winning final victory in the Greater East Asia War.

"Since the work of this Movement is very closely linked with the policy of the Dai Nippon Military Government, all leaders must bear in mind that they should have a profound knowledge of, and faith in, the aims and objectives of the Dai Nippon Army."

In this address the Putera leaders were further urged:

"Do your utmost always to be fully aware of the existing limitations in the present situation, and never lead the common people astray.

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"objectives of this Movement, and that you will cooperate
 "in the establishment of the Co-prosperity Sphere in
 "Greater East Asia and build a New Java to be a member in
 "the family of nations within the Co-prosperity Sphere in
 "Greater East Asia."

The functions of the Putera were officially set out in the following ten points:

1. To impress upon the Indonesian population their duties and responsibilities in regard to the establishment of a "New Java".
2. To eliminate Occidental influences.
3. To participate in the defence of Greater East Asia.
4. To foster self-discipline in bearing all mental and physical privations necessary for winning ultimate victory.
5. To deepen mutual understanding between the Japanese and Indonesians.
6. To encourage the study of the Japanese language.
7. To raise the standards of the Indonesian population and develop their capacities and character.
8. To encourage the care of health and sport in order to improve the physique of the population.
9. To encourage thrift and savings.
10. To encourage higher production in every field and to develop a love of work.

The Putera was only intended for Indonesians.. The new social hierarchy, as introduced by the Japanese, comprised the following grades: 1. Japanese; 2. Indonesians; 3. other Asiatics; (Chinese, Arabs, Indians, etc.); 4. mixtures of Indonesians with other groups; 5. Europeans. Thereby, Indonesians, being the "original inhabitants", were treated as a privileged category groups 3 to 5 were treated as foreigners, so that they occupied a less favourable legal position (also as mentioned, they had to pay registration fees). In this less favoured position, there

were grades, dependent upon whether the groups were Asiatic or European in character. The latter, including the Eurasians, were the most severely treated.

About the same time as the institution of the Putera, the position of "foreigners" became still less favourable; an Ordinance of 4 February 1943 forbade them to travel from one Residence to another without permission from the police. Moreover, it was ordered that everyone (private individuals included) must immediately inform the police when lodging someone from outside the place of his residence. The Keiboodan was brought in for the purpose of supervision. Moreover, "forbidden zones" were introduced, covering the entire South coast and the two Eastern and Western extremities of Java. In these zones, no "foreigners" at all were allowed to enter, and even Indonesians had to obtain a pass from the police.

It was not until later that the Asiatic section of the 'foreigners' was accorded the same status as the Indonesians.

The first great enthusiasm for the Putera dwindled when it became apparent that the activities of this body, to which the population had looked forward, were to be entirely restricted to the basic principles laid down by the Japanese propaganda service. Thus, there was great disappointment when the originally planned Youth Movement of the Putera was forbidden, and the Japanese authorities set up instead their own youth movement, the "Seindan", the direction of which remained entirely in Japanese hands.

In actual fact, it became apparent that the Putera was not intended to exercise initiative, and that its only purpose was to make propaganda for the Japanese slogans of the day.

On the other hand, outside the East Indies great changes had taken place; Japan had been forced from an offensive into a defensive position. Lines of communication were seriously threatened. An intensified war effort was called for, especially in the Southern Regions where Japanese armies had to rely increasingly on their own resources as time went on.

To this end the cooperation of the population was imperative

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The battle-cry of "New Java" began to lose its spell; it became necessary to substantiate this slogan. Sufficient means were available to the Japanese from their stock of Co-prosperity Sphere ideas; between the status of a directly administered colony, and that of an independent puppet-state there were many possibilities, all leading to the same Japanese aim, the hegemony of Greater East Asia, cloaked under the guise of paternal leadership in the "Co-prosperity" Sphere.

3. The Further Political Coordination of the Indonesian Population.

The Initiation of the Policy of Easy Promises.

Tojo's Promise.

On 16 June 1943 Prime Minister Tojo made a speech at the 82nd Session of the Diet wherein, inter alia, he stated^{that} in view of the fact that the people of Java had shown their readiness to cooperate with the Japanese Military Administration, they should be given self-government (Seizi Sen-yo).

On this occasion Prime Minister Tojo also promised so-called independence to Burma, (effective from 1 August 1943) and to the Philippines (effective from some time in the course of 1943). In regard to Java he said:

"The populations in Lalai, Sumatra, Djawa, Borneo, Celebes and other places under Nipponese military administrations are assiduously extending their cooperation toward Nippon. Even in the midst of war, they have been liberated and accorded educational and cultural blessings under the sympathetic guidance of the Nipponese authorities, so that they are now enjoying a life of hope and happiness never experienced in the past. It is, I believe, a matter of hearty congratulation for the Indonesian people.

It is our intention to go further and, in pursuance of the aspirations of the natives, to take measures step by step envisaging the participation of the native populations in government to the extent commensurate with the degree of

their ability in the course of the year. In particular, we intend to realize this state of affairs as early as possible in Djawa in view of the advanced conditions of the island and in response to the desire of the people there".

In pursuance of this promise, Prime Minister Tojo visited the Southern Regions in person after Aoki, the Minister for Greater East Asia had previously visited the Southern Regions, including Java, in the spring of 1943 and sounded public opinion on the spot.

On his way, Tojo called at Manila and Singapore, repeating the promise of "independence" of the Philippines in Manila, and of Burma in Singapore to the Burmese leaders who had gathered there. In Java no "independence" was promised, but only participation in the government. This meant, in fact, that Java and the other islands remained separately incorporated in the Japanese Empire as directly administered territories. The promise was coupled with the conditions that there should be complete cooperation with the Japanese Military Administration in order to win ultimate victory.

In August 1943 events proved what this promise was worth, after gratitude therefor had been harped upon by the Japanese propaganda service for fully three months:

- a. The appointment of various Indonesians to higher office. An Indonesian (formerly Chief of a Department) was appointed head of the Syuumubu (Department of Religious Affairs); actual control remained in the hands of three Japanese heads of sections. Two others were appointed to the Syuutyoo (Head of a Residency) in the two smallest residencies of Java. However, a Japanese Fuku-Syuutyoo (Vice-Head) was appointed who, in reality, held the direction in his hands. Furthermore, a number of Indonesians were officially appointed to lower positions, which as a matter of fact they had occupied before. They were incorporated in the Japanese Administrative Corps and were accorded corresponding Japanese

ranks.

- b. Next, the institution of the "San-yo Seido" (Adviser) was introduced; Indonesians were nominated to be San-yo to seven Departments; thus, for example, Sukarno was appointed San-yo to the Soemuhu (Department of General Affairs). These appointments appeared more important than they were in reality. The San-yo only acted when questions were referred to him for advice.
- c. The third means whereby Tojo's promise was partially fulfilled was the introduction of the so-called Sangi-Kai. In all residencies and also in the special municipality of Batavia (which was of the same standing as a residency) an advisory body was established to advise the Resident in matters of local government. The Sangi-Kai was established by Ordinance No. 37 of the Commander-in-Chief, dated 5 September 1943. This Ordinance prescribed the number of members of each Sangi Kai to be chosen by election. The other members were appointed by the Syuutyoo (the Japanese Resident); their maximum number was subject to restriction. As a matter of fact, equal numbers of members were nominated and elected. The "elections" were indirect: each Kutuyoo (village chief) nominated one elector from his village; these electors gathered (not in public) under the chairmanship of the Resident; during the meeting candidates were nominated and were immediately voted for by show of hands. Consequently, nomination of the candidates was not public, and the ballot, on the other hand, was not secret.

The function of the Sangi Kai was to answer questions concerning local government put to it by the Syuutyoo (Resident) and at the same time it could make suggestion to the Syuutyoo on that subject. This Advisory Council could only meet on orders from the Syuutyoo, and the questions to be answered were announced. Sitzings were

also opened and closed on the Syuutyoo's orders.

On instructions from the latter, officials of the Syuutyoo office could be present at the sessions and participate in the discussions.

The sessions were only public as regards the opening address, which was drafted and censored beforehand. The sessions proper were held behind closed doors, whereas the closing session was generally public. At that session motions, discussed and settled during the closed meetings in reply to the questions put by the Syuutyoo, were put to a mock vote. Consequently, it is not to be wondered at that all motions were always passed unanimously. Sessions scarcely ever lasted longer than four to five days. The Chairman was appointed from amongst the members on nomination by the Syuutyoo; in this connection the Sangi Kei proposed two names in secret, the Syuutyoo, however, not being bound thereby.

Every Sangi Kei sent representatives to the Tyuwoo Sangi-In, the Central Advisory Council of Java.

This Tyuwoo Sangi-In was likewise established on 5 September 1943, by Ordinance No. 36, "for the speedy and efficient execution of the measures of the Military Government". Twenty-three out of forty-three members were nominated in advance by the Commander-in-Chief; for this purpose, the latter had to select from the inhabitants of Java those "who are of good character and have much knowledge and lofty principles". Of the remainder, seventeen were "elected" in the prescribed manner by the various Sangi Kei (Advisory Councils) of the Residencies, and one by the Sangi Kei of the Tokubetsu Si (Special Municipality) of Batavia. Two members were nominated by the Sultanates of Jogjakarta and Surakarta. The procedure adopted by the Sangi Kei (local Advisory Councils) and the Tyuwoo Sangi-In (Central Advisory Council) was the same.

Both Councils were only empowered to offer advice in respect of questions put to them by the Commander-in-Chief or the Resident, and to make suggestions relating thereto. For example, the only question put before the first session of the Tyuuo Sangi-In reads as follows: "By what means can the population of Java make a greater contribution towards the total war effort for the achievement of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere?"

Nominally the direction of the Tyuuo Sangi-In rested with the Chairman, who was appointed by the Commander-in-Chief on secret (but not binding) proposal by the Tyuuo Sangi-In. The actual direction of affairs, however, rested with the Head of the Record Office, called the Tyuuo Sangi-In Zina Kyoku Tyoo. He was a Japanese, as were also the other officials of this office with the exception of a few interpreters. The function of this office was to deal with incoming and outgoing correspondence as well as to exercise internal supervision over the activities of the Tyuuo Sangi-In. The Head and his staff were appointed by the Commander-in-Chief; the first Head was the then private secretary of Prime Minister Tojo.

Similarly, the Secretary (kyoki) of the Sangi Kai (local Advisory Council) nominated by the Syuutyoo; he was always a Japanese from the latter's office. The procedure adopted at the sessions of the Tyuuo Sangi-In (Central Advisory Council) was characterized by the speech of the Gunseikan (Head of the Military Administration) at the closing of the first session of this body.

He expressed gratitude to Japanese officials of the Record Office as well as of the Gunseikanbu (Headquarters Military Administration) for the hard work they had done late into the night, in order to guide members in

the application of the ideals of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. He also thanked the members for their readiness to cooperate, but pointed out that there were still too many members who were under the influence of democratic ideas, which caused considerable loss of time.

- d. Finally, Tojo's promise of Seizi Senyo (participation in the government) was realized by according somewhat wider administrative powers to the Ra (Sultans) of Central-Java in the sphere of elementary village education, local government at lower levels, public health, and farming, etc.

From the foregoing it is clear, that this "participation in the government" amounted to little. The participation of Indonesians in the Central Government of the country was by far not so great as it had been long before 1942. The representative bodies then existing possessed far wider powers and rights than the newly introduced "Advisory Councils", and their composition was considerably more representative.

The new Advisory Councils were neither independent, nor had they any real authority; the further regulations concerning "participation in the government" were such that power remained essentially in Japanese hands.

4. Militarization of the Indonesians.

More or less simultaneously with the promulgation of the Ordinances for the establishment of the Tyuuoo Sangi-In (Central Advisory Council) in pursuance of the Tojo promise, there was a symptom typical of the methods employed by the Japanese propaganda service.

As was later officially declared by the Commander-in-Chief, the Japanese Military Administration was of opinion that the Indonesian population of Java ought to give concrete expression of its appreciation of Prime Minister Tojo's promise now that it had been translated into fact, and that, among other things,

it was the duty of the population to demonstrate its preparedness to support the Japanese Military Administration by organizing a Volunteers' Corps.

The propaganda service ensured that it should appear to the outside world that the inhabitants themselves were desirous of having their own army.

At the end of August 1943, an old friend of Sukarno forwarded a petition, signed "with his own blood", to the Commander-in-Chief of Java for permission to set up a Volunteers' Corps. Within a week all Kentyos (Regents) of Java followed with similar requests; all prominent Indonesian personalities were interviewed, and naturally expressed the opinion that the above request met with their full approval. The "Four Serangkai" also came forward with a similar request "on behalf of the Indonesian community", so that it aroused no surprise when the Commander-in-Chief declared in the beginning of October 1943 that he was favourably disposed towards these petitions, and that he considered, moreover, that the population of Java was very rightly desirous of offering some return for Tojo's promise. By Ordinance he instituted the Kyodo Boeji Giyu Gun (Army of Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland).

This was effected by Ordinance No. 44, dated 3 October 1943. The aim of the Corps was "to call upon the original inhabitants (i.e., Indonesians) for the defence of Java, based upon the principle of the joint defence of Greater East Asia".

Art. 4 laid down:

"The Volunteer Corps should be thoroughly convinced of the ideals and importance of the task of defending the Homeland, and it is its duty to partake in the defence of the home country in the respective Syuu against the Allies under the leadership of the Dai Nippon Army".

By virtue of this Ordinance, the Giyu Gun was commanded by the Commander-in-Chief of Java. It was emphatically stated that this Corps was not to form part of the Japanese Army; it would be trained by Japanese instructors; whereas it would have

its own Officers' Corps. It would not be used outside Java and would serve to defend Java against the Allies. The Corps would consist of volunteers.

Recruiting for the first levy started immediately, but with the following levies it appeared that there was insufficient enthusiasm, so that with each new levy each Regency was told how many "volunteers" were required in order to bring formations up to strength.

In October 1943 the training of the "officers" was started; their training lasted for three months, so that in fact they received at best a training of a non-commissioned officer. After that, with a great show of propaganda they were sworn in before the Commander-in-Chief at a grand meeting in Batavia. Some time later, when the other ranks had been drilled for a similar period of three months there followed a solemn handing over of the colours to the various battalions.

The object was to form one or more battalions of about 1000 men per Syuu (Residency) which would together make up a unit for the defence of the Syuu. At the time of Japan's capitulation this object had been achieved. In the defence of the Syuu, the task of the Giyu Gun was mainly one of guarding road junctions, bridges and other strategically important points. Weapons were only supplied to these "volunteers" for the duration of the drills and training, whereafter they had to be turned in to the Japanese guard of the barracks. As for that, the training mostly took place with wooden guns. For the clothing of these troops the confiscated Royal Netherlands Indies Army uniforms were used, after slight alteration.

The Beppan, a special section of the Headquarters of the 16th Japanese Army (stationed in Java), which was, inter alia, an intelligence organization, was charged with training, and at the same time made use of it both for spying upon the new volunteers, as well as using them as spies.

Before this, the Japanese were making use of Indonesians by way of auxiliary troops. Indeed, shortly after the occupation of Java, many Indonesian soldiers of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army were partly recruited and partly compelled to serve as a "Heiho" (auxiliary soldier). Thus, for instance, all Indonesian anti-aircraft gunners were recruited or forced to serve as Heiho with Japanese anti-aircraft units.

The Heiho units formed part of the Japanese Army and was issued with a Japanese uniform. These units were generally used in the Ordnance Corps, and also to guard camps occupied by women and civilian internees. Heiho, in contrast to the Giyu Gun (Volunteer Corps) were sent off the island.

The Japanese Navy similarly made use of Indonesian Heiho.

The training of both the Giyu Gun and the Heiho was on the Japanese plan; they were taught to speak Japanese; commands were issued in Japanese; and the regulations, which they had to know by heart were in Japanese. They wore Japanese insignia. Here too, of course, an important part of the training was instruction in "Seisin" (Spirit) that is to say instruction in the Greater East Asia ideals and fostering of enthusiasm for this war.

The first steps had been taken toward the militarization of the Indonesian population, in order that it might be used to assist the Japanese army for military purposes. Later, this process was extended to the whole population. Gradually, the Japanese realized that they would be cut off in the distant island of the South, and would be obliged to build up their defence with local resources and auxiliaries.

5. The aims of Japanese Propaganda.

a. Recruitment of Heiho and Volunteers.

Henceforth one of the chief activities of the Japanese propaganda service was to encourage enlistment in the Heiho or Volunteer Corps.

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The two other important aims of Japanese propaganda were:

- b. The increase of farming crops and their delivery to the Japanese Military Administration.

Since Java served as a base not only for the providing of essential supplies for the other parts of the East Indies, but also for the Japanese occupation troops, and for the Japanese troops fighting in the East, the island had to provide large quantities of food. Besides, the Japanese army of occupation was laying up large stocks of supplies against the eventuality of communications with the outside being cut off and of operations in Java. Java, which before the war had barely been able to meet the essential food requirements of its own population, was therefore expected to produce more. This increase in production was obstructed by various factors, such as the ever more pressing lack of proper supervision over irrigation works, and the like, due to the fact that expert Dutch officials had been interned, and the Japanese who took over were insufficiently familiar with the situation, and were not properly trained. A second factor was the haphazard methods adopted by the Japanese in the pursuance of their ends. Thus, for example, from the very beginning, the Japanese advocated the planting of cotton, which they regarded as a solution for the threatened shortage of clothing. Although long before the war, scientific tests had shown that the planting of cotton in the East Indies had no chance of success, the Japanese thought that they would succeed where others had failed, and they spent a great deal of capital in planting cotton over wide areas. At places where their propaganda did not produce satisfactory results quickly enough, and the inhabitants did not of their own accord switch over to the cultivation of cotton, the Japanese stepped in abruptly and ordered that specified areas had to be planted with cotton in certain Regencies.

The same was the case with the castor-oil plant, the planting of which was advocated by the Japanese, and from which they intended to obtain lubricating oil for their aircraft.

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Again, the cultivation of fibrous crops was propagated. The Japanese needed these fibres to provide a substitute for gunny bags which before the war had chiefly been imported from India, and which formed an indispensable article for the conveyance of the bulk of agricultural produce, such as rice, sugar, coffee, etc. This further reduced the area available for food crops.

It became less and less advantageous for the simple farmer to hand over his produce to the Japanese authorities. From the outset, the Japanese adopted the policy of the Netherlands Indies Government to stabilize the price of rice (the staple food of the population) at a proper level. In view of the fact, however, that the Japanese military guilder was progressively decreasing in its purchasing value, the official price for rice soon fell far below its former value relative to other commodities. Articles that the farmer used to buy with the proceeds of his rice, such as clothing, other food products, and agricultural implements, were virtually unobtainable. In any case they were not obtainable for the official price of rice. The result was that the farmers were obliged to dispose of their rice for next to nothing.

Therefore, the Japanese authorities ordered that 60% of the harvest of food produce had to be delivered. To keep the situation under control the Japanese were obliged to take far-reaching measures in order to combat the black market in rice and other food products. One of these measures was the imposing of closed regional economic areas, enforced by checkpoints on the highways. The threshing of rice - except for individual consumption - in order that "coordinated" mills was prohibited.

The propaganda service had to exert all its powers in order to persuade the farmers, against their own interests, to cultivate wider areas in order to obtain more produce.

On the other hand, it was still more important for the propaganda service to persuade the inhabitants to yield their crops to the Japanese Military Administration and it became increasingly important for the Japanese to obtain satisfactory cooperation from the population.

c. The recruitment of labour.

Japan was in great need of manpower. Not only in Java, but throughout the Southern Regions, Japan required labour everywhere, for the building of military fortifications, airfields, strategic railways, etc.

As one of the most densely populated areas of the world, Java was a welcome source for such labour. From the very commencement, Japanese propaganda went all out to encourage the voluntary enlistment of these coolies. In this at first the Japanese were successful up to a point. However, as soon as the inhabitants knew how these coolies were being treated by the Japanese, the desire to work for them practically disappeared. This became still worse when the coolies sent out of Java (usually recruited for a period of three months) did not return, and no news whatever was received from them.

In consequence, the Japanese were driven to adopt conscription, whereby each Regency was informed as to how many coolies had to be drafted, both for the work in Java itself, and for labour outside that island.

In order to compensate as far as possible for the disadvantageous consequences of this compulsory recruiting, in 1943 the propaganda service started a vigorous campaign in which the "Prajurit Ekonomi" (the economic warrior) was represented as fulfilling a sacred task by working for the Japanese Army. It was no longer permissible to speak of coolies; the coolie was also a soldier, and his contribution to the war effort had to be greatly appreciated.

Behind the make-believe of honouring the "economic warrior", one of the greatest tragedies of this war was staged. The manner in which those "Prajurit Pekerja" (soldiers of labour) were treated defies all description. The care taken of them was still less than that accorded prisoners of war and internees, and negligence towards them had all the more serious results since they were insufficiently enlightened to take hygienic precautions and medical care of themselves. The correct figures of those who were transported outside Java as Romushas (Prajurit Pekerja) are not known; the official estimates of the Japanese after the capitulation mention the figure of 270,000 men, of whom not more than 70,000 have been recovered since the war. The state in which most of them were found after the capitulation of Japan was appalling. Most of them have been made to suffer inhumane maltreatment; accommodation, food medical care, were not only thoroughly inadequate, but in many cases absent altogether. During certain periods, "romushas" who had died from starvation and contagious diseases were daily carried away by the cartload from certain camps.

Perhaps this category of "Greater East Asiatics" have experienced the very worst of what the Co-Prosperity Sphere under the leadership of Japan implied.

6. What the Tyuwoo Sangi-In (Central Advisory Council) amounted to.

At its very first session, the Tyuwoo Sangi-In was used as an instrument for Japanese propaganda. The Commander-in-Chief of Java referred the following question to it:

"By what means can the population of Java make a greater contribution towards the total war effort for the achievement of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere?"

This question was answered in four motions which as described, were unanimously passed. The first motion gave thanks by the members of the Tyuuoo Sangi-In to the Japanese Military Administration for the establishment of this Advisory Council. The second motion dealt with coolie recruitment. It was proposed in this motion to set up the "Badan Penolong Prajurit Pekerja" (Body in Aid of Economic Warriors), usually referred to as B.P.³. This organization would in the first instance be used for propaganda in recruiting coolies, and would at the same time undertake to care for the entertainment and recreation of the coolies, and for the families they had left behind in Java. It would ensure that the coolies would have the opportunity of corresponding with their families, whereas their relatives would receive further support from this organization. The Japanese Administration did not regard this its own responsibility. Experience proved that little was done in the matter of paying part of the wages to relatives left behind.

The Japanese Commander-in-Chief of Java officially founded this B. P.³ and its activities were in fact mainly restricted to the only aim which was of interest to the Japanese, namely, the recruiting of coolies. The Japanese saw in this body a convenient organization to attract volunteers and send them to the ports. Little was achieved by the several movements sponsored by this body for the collection of money for relatives who had been left behind, because the public had little confidence that this money would be spent for that purpose. Consequently, the results of such collections were negligible.

The recruiting of the coolies was undertaken by every possible means; one of these was that the houses of relatives left behind were provided with a sign "Prajurit Pekerja", and it was pointed out to the public that one should honour such houses and their occupants, whilst this sign was said henceforth to guarantee special protection. Furthermore, theoretically these relatives enjoyed certain privileges in the distribution of

commodities that were scarce, such as clothing, - a privilege enjoyed only after all the government officials had received their share.

In the third motion gratitude was voiced to the Japanese Commander-in-Chief for the establishment of the Giyu Gun (Volunteers Corps) and applauded the first levy - which was already under training.

For the recruiting of Heiho and "volunteers" an organization was recommended which was called the Booei Engo Kai, with instructions in regard to Heiho and volunteers similar to those the B.P.³ had in regard to coolies.

The result again was that the Japanese had another organization at hand for their purposes.

The fourth motion in high-flown language exhorted the population to cooperate for an increased agricultural output, and for delivery of crops to the Japanese Military Government.

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The process of coordinating political activities among the Indonesian population was completed and these activities had been made subservient to Japanese Imperial ambitions.

2. Coordination of Religious activities.

In religious matters, too, the propaganda service made an effort to obtain complete cooperation from the population.

These activities were especially directed at influencing the Mohammedans, who formed the large majority of the population. Therefore, in the following only propaganda amongst the Muslims will be considered. Propaganda amongst the other religions was of far less importance. It is yet to be mentioned that priests and preachers of an "enemy race" were forbidden to conduct services except for people of an "enemy race". If an "enemy" priest or preacher noticed an Indonesian among the

commodities that were scarce, such as clothing, - a privilege enjoyed only after all the government officials had received their share.

In the third motion gratitude was voiced to the Japanese Commander-in-Chief for the establishment of the Giyu Gun (Volunteers Corps) and applauded the first levy - which was already under training.

For the recruiting of Heiho and "volunteers" an organization was recommended which was called the Booei Engo Kai, with instructions in regard to Heiho and volunteers similar to those the B.P.³ had in regard to coolies.

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congregation he was to see to it that the latter left on penalty of very severe punishment.

From the very outset the Japanese made an effort to establish one organization in regard to religious affairs, specially for the Islamites; this organization would readily convey the Japanese aims to the population and would, it was hoped, be inducive to a maximum war effort through voluntary cooperation. Several attempts in that direction by the Japanese failed at first because of discord in Islamic circles in regard to religious principles. More particularly, the amalgamation of the two largest Islamic unions, the "Mohammadiyah" and "Nahdatul Ulama", the former being progressive, the latter being very orthodox, encountered many obstacles. Not until November 1943 did the Japanese succeed in uniting these two unions together with two smaller unions into one mother organization, the "Mashumi" (abbreviation for "Majelis Shura Muslimin Indonesia" - Consultative Council of Indonesian Islamites).

The Mohammedan intellectuals were thus coordinated. However, apart from this group there was the very large number of Kiais (expounders of the Koran) and Ulamas (teachers on religious matters). They were not closely connected with Islamic intellectuals, but to the Japanese it was imperative to gain a hold especially on this numerous group of people, who, simple as they were, exercised a considerable influence in the villages.

The Japanese established the Syuumubu (Religious Affairs Department), originally under Japanese direction, but since November 1943 under Indonesian direction with Japanese heads of sections. This change was the result of Tojo's promise.

From the very beginning the Syuumubu tried to obtain influence amongst the population through these kiais and ulamas. As far back as July 1942 the then Japanese Head of the Syuumubu began to travel about Java. He held meetings in each Syuu (Residency) for about 500 or 600 kiais and ulamas who had been

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ordered to attend by the local administration in each place. He held forth on Japanese views and aims in the usual vein and then tried to sound the opinion of his audience. He was assisted by five Japanese who appeared in Arabian dress and assumed the title of Hadji in combination with Arabian names: Hadji Abdul Hamid Ono, Hadji Abdul Mun'im Inada, Hadji Saleh Suzuki, Hadji Mohamad Taufik Sasaki, Hadji Abdul Munir Watanabe. (Only those who have made the pilgrimage to Mecca are allowed to use the title of Hadji). The result of these propaganda tours was a great meeting of representatives of all scholars and teachers on religion from all residencies, held at Batavia on 7 December 1942. The Gunseikan made a speech in which the Japanese policy in regard to the Islamites in Java was explained.

This policy embodied three principles. Firstly, the Japanese Army declared itself to be the protector of Islam and that the Mohammedan religion would be respected. This declaration was not entirely superfluous as respect for mosques etc. had not always been in evidence until then. This point was elucidated by the assurance that the chotbah (address after the Friday-prayer in the mosque) would not be interfered with from now on as long as the speaker stuck to purely religious subjects. Digression on worldly subjects was only permitted if cooperation with Japan was advocated.

The second point concerned the activities of religious associations. Until then the position of these congregations in regard to the ban on associations had not been sufficiently clear. The Gunseikan now declared that these congregations in so far as they were exclusively religious, would soon be authorized to carry on their activities and that they had the noble task of propagating the ideals of Great East Asia and the support of the Military Administration. In other words their activities would not be interfered with as long as cooperation with Japan was advocated.

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The third point concerned religious education. According to the declaration of the Gunseikan the youth was of such paramount importance for the future of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, that the very best of Japanese culture was hardly good enough. In practice, this amounted to the fact that the Japanese Military Administration wished to keep the education of youth in their own hands. The cooperation of the Islamic community in this respect was acceptable only in so far as it was directed at full support to the Japanese Army and imbued with the ideals of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. With this restriction religious education was permitted and would even be officially supported with books and other facilities. The Syuumubu (Religious Affairs Department) did indeed distribute some pamphlets in which Japan's role as protector of Islam was glorified.

The representatives were furthermore entertained with many speeches by influential Japanese, including the above mentioned Japanese Hadji. They were also invited to a dinner at the official residence of the Commander-in-Chief of Java.

This reception made a great impression on these simple folk who had mostly had nothing but a Koran education, who could at best speak and read the Arabic language, and whose local fame was usually based more on mystical claims than on true learning. For these same reasons they were looked down upon by the intellectual world; the great interest and the visible appreciation displayed by the Japanese authorities obviously had considerable effect upon them.

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The Syuunubu established a permanent training centre in Batavia in order to work on these kiais and ulamas. At this institute, courses of three weeks were repeated for groups of sixty kiais and ulamas each, during which Japanese ideology was indoctrinated.

The Japanese realized that the participants at these courses mirrored what was going on in the masses. These courses were therefore also used to test whether the propaganda had any effect and to afford the Japanese an opportunity of selecting suitable collaborators. In this way the Japanese found accomplices who would carry over their propaganda to the simple rural population, and who would be responsible for sufficient rice being grown and delivered, for a sufficient number of romushas (labourers) reporting, and for the interest in enlistment as "volunteer" or heiho being stimulated. To this end the Japanese adopted the old device of working on the fanaticism of Islamites. They tried to persuade the kiais and ulamas to declare the Greater East Asia War as a "sabil" (holy) war, being a war against the kafir (unbeliever). The fact that the Japanese were themselves kafirs to the Islamites had to be disguised as far as possible by the propaganda service. As soon as this point was raised, the "common ancestry", the "common race" and the "destiny common to the Japanese and the Indonesians" were pointed out.

There was another difficulty which the Japanese propaganda service had either to explain away or overlook. Strict adherence to the Shinto-glorification of the Japanese Emperor e.g. the obligatory bow even for Islamites in the direction of the Tokyo Palace (Saikairai) at the inception of every meeting was a sore point to sincere Mohammedans. The same applied to the oaths of ever-lasting loyalty to Japan, the renewal of which was exacted time and again.

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In the beginning of 1944 religious disturbances occurred in the Indramayu district and at Garut. The population was all the more responsive owing to the heavy pressure of the Japanese occupation. The Japanese held the Indonesian leader of the Syuumubu (Religious Affairs Department) responsible; he had proved that he did not possess enough influence amongst the population and he was replaced by one of the oldest and most popular kiais of Java. This man aged 70 a teacher of the Faith in the area of Jombang near Sourabaya, accepted this post and spent one day in Batavia. However, he immediately returned to his Ashrama (religious institution) leaving the direction of the Syuumubu to the Japanese heads of sections.

Since November 1943 the Mashumi became the organization through which the Japanese authorities ruled the Islamic intellectual world. Here again a dual purpose is evident: propaganda for Japanese ideals on the one hand; organization for espionage and information to sound the Islamic intellectual world, on the other.

For these reasons the relationship between the Mashumi and the Syuumubu was constantly strengthened until at last the Mashumi was to all intents and purposes directed by the Syuumubu.

Besides this the Japanese established so called Syuumuka (Religious Affairs Sections) in all Syuu (Residencies). These Syuumuka acted as local sections of the Syuumubu. Collaborators selected from amongst the locally prominent kiais were put in charge of these Syuumuka. It was their task to make Military Administration policy understood in the villages. These agencies were gradually extended to the Gun (district), the Son (sub-district) and even to each Ku (village) where a local kiai was in charge. In this way the Japanese propaganda service extended its

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scope by one more carefully supervised organization. Furthermore, this machinery, of course, served the Japanese for purposes of espionage.

In order to reach the large mass of kiais and ulanas the Syuunubu issued a publication called "Asshu'llah", edited in three languages, Malay, Javanese and Sundanese, but printed in Arab script because the orthodox kiais could not read anything else. This periodical was distributed free of charge amongst all kiais in Java.

The Japanese propaganda service thus gained a solid foothold in the Islamic world, which was now coordinated in two ways and directed towards Japanese aims.

8. Political Coordination of the Chinese Community.

The Japanese also tried from the outset to coordinate the Chinese who if compared to the Indonesians comprised only a small number in Java. However, they form an important section of the population, as they are the mainstay of the middle class. The resistance offered by the Chinese community was considerable. Notwithstanding the large scale internment in 1942 of all those prominent Chinese and Indo-Chinese, who were known to be pro-Chungking, the Japanese found it difficult to obtain sufficient collaboration from that community. The first efforts to induce leading officials of the many Chinese associations (which had all been dissolved in March 1942) to form one big organization were a complete failure. This was partly due to the individualistic disposition of the Chinese.

The Japanese decided, therefore, to force a decision in August 1943 and established the so called Kakyoo Sookai with the support of a few prominent pro-Nanking Chinese.

The Kakyoo Sookai was organized again along well-known lines. The direction was appointed by the Japanese authorities and close cooperation with the Japanese Military Administration was the prime object. No action was taken on their own

initiative and the Kakyoo Sockai was in fact an extension of Japanese propaganda and served the Japanese as an organization for espionage in the same way as the Putera did among the Indonesians.

9. Political Coordination of the Eurasian Community.

As mentioned above, the Japanese had enforced a new social hierarchy immediately on assuming power. The Chinese and Eurasian groups of the population were accorded the lowest grade in this hierarchy and Occidentals not born in Java were not mentioned at all. They were all interned in camps as enemies.

However, the Japanese Military Administration could not long persist in this attitude as these sections of the population constituted important factors in the economic and social structure of Java. In regard to the Eurasians it may be said that they occupied mainly the middle strata of the technical and administrative occupations in which they could not easily be replaced. Japanese replaced them in the higher ranks, but there were no Japanese available for the large group of intermediate ranks; and Indonesians could not take over owing to a lack of sufficient numbers of trained personnel.

In return for the political coordination of the Chinese in August 1943, the Japanese had to make certain concessions, such as the granting of permission for very limited Chinese private school education, which had hitherto been forbidden as it was for the Eurasians. The Japanese also allowed small remittances to be sent to support their families in Japanese-occupied parts of China. This permission later proved to be a blind.

The first effort to secure the cooperation of the Eurasian group was made in September 1943. Japanese policy underwent a change in this period. Instead of regarding the Eurasians as "aliens," the Japanese gradually changed

over to treating them as belonging to the indigenous population and placing them next to the Indonesian group.

The Japanese stipulated however, that the Eurasians had to realize that from then on they had to feel and act as members of the Greater East Asia community under the leadership of Japan, and had to renounce their Western ancestry.

The proclamation of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief of September 1943 in which the appeal for cooperation from the Eurasian community was couched ended with the implied threat that, failing compliance, force would be used.

The Japanese promised the Eurasians, on the other hand, to permit admittance of a number of their children to village schools which had so far been reserved for Indonesian children. Separate schools for Eurasian children were still forbidden.

10. The Formation of an Asiatic Front. Coordination of all Population Groups of the Asiatic.

In the meantime there was a gradual change of Japanese policy. Instead of the formation of an Indonesian front (Putera) the Japanese now played with the idea of forming an Asiatic front, comprising all Asiatic groups of Java. They decided to dissolve the Putera and to replace it by an organization in which all Asiatics would combine efforts to achieve ultimate victory in the Holy War.

The Putera did not develop along lines as expected by the Japanese. According to them it had failed to reach the simple villager, which was what they considered vitally important. This rural population comprised about 80% of the total population of Java and had to supply the man power for army and labor services and the production of food crops for the Japanese.

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Besides, the Putera threatened to outgrow Japanese control; the movement succeeded in spite of all supervision in becoming too strongly nationalists in outlook for Japanese taste.

Therefore, in the beginning of 1944 the Japanese introduced a new system of influencing the people, resorting to measures similar to those applied in Japan. They decided that the only way in which they could make the population pay attention to their propaganda was by combining their propaganda machinery with the organization for the distribution of essential supplies.

Starting in January 1944, the whole of Java was divided into small communities of about 20 houses each. These communities were called Tonari Gumi (Neighbours' Associations) and served as units for distribution as well as for Japanese propaganda.

These Tonari Gumi were organized on autocratic lines. They were headed by a Kunityoo, who was appointed from above and who was responsible for the execution of the orders given to him.

All existing associations, social, fire precautionary, agricultural, etc., were absorbed by the Tonari Gumi.

The duties of this institution were very extensive. Not only distribution, but also regular training for air raid defense and guerilla warfare were its responsibility. Furthermore, the head of the community had to lecture at least once a week to his people on Japanese ideology and the practical application thereof. At these meetings the Japanese aims in regard to the population were extolled in every key according to instructions from the Japanese propaganda service. This was done mostly by Indonesians, specially trained by the Japanese who remained behind the scene in order to gain greater confidence of the population.

Other meetings were held for larger units (called Aza; a village was divided into two or more Aza) once a month. One member of each family had to attend these meetings.

All inhabitants of the area of one Tonari Gumi had

to be members of this organization; this also applied to those Eurasians who had not yet been interned. Only membership gave distribution facilities.

As soon as this new distribution organization, used at the same time for espionage amongst its members, was working satisfactorily, the Japanese capped it with a new political organization which not only comprised the Indonesian population but all other Asiatic groups as well.

With this new organization, the Putera had become useless to the Japanese authorities and was liquidated on the same day that the new organization came into being, which caused resentment amongst Indonesian Putera leaders.

The new organization, comprising all Asiatic groups of the population, was called the "Jawa Pookoo Kai" (Corporation for Communal Services in Java) and was officially installed on 9 March 1944, which was commemoration day of the foundation of "New Java." This corporation remained the organization through which the Japanese tried to reach all groups of the population until 31 August 1945, when it was dissolved by decree of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief of Java.

According to the official explanation accompanying the Ordinance (8 January 1944) founding the Jawa Pookoo Kai the latter was set up as an organ of the Military Administration. The purpose was to carry out the instructions of the Military Administration in an atmosphere of "friendly cooperation" with all inhabitants. It was the organization's duty to see that these instructions reached all the people and it was supposed to work in close relationship with the Tonari Gumi. Its leaders were responsible for seeing that everyone was enlisted in the positive support of the Military Administration.

According to this explanation the Jawa Pookoo Kai was in fact an executive body, based on the principle of complete coordination of all inhabitants and was, therefore, an

organization of the entire populace. Thus it was different in character from the Yokusankai in Japan (Corporation for the Promotion of National Policy), the Kyowakai ("Concordia Corporation") in Manchuria and the Shinninkai (New People's association) in North China, which were selected bodies and therefore agencies of support.

The central direction of the Jawa Hookoo Kai was appointed by the Commander-in-Chief and consisted of Japanese exclusively. Only to the Executive Bureau, being under supervision of the central direction, were several Indonesians appointed. Branches of the Hookoo Kai were established in all residencies (e.g., in Sourabaya: the Sourabaya Syuu Hookoo Kai), in the regencies (Ken Hookoo Kai), in the districts (Gun Hookoo Kai), in the sub-districts (Son Hookoo Kai) and in the villages (Ku Hookoo Kai). The Ku Hookoo Kai supervised one or more of the above-mentioned Aza which in turn supervised a number of Tonari Gumi.

The leader of these local Hookoo Kai was the head of the local administration, assisted by a council (Kaigi), appointed by this head. A session of the Kaigi had to be held at least every six months, when ways and means of promoting assistance to the Military Government had to be discussed.

As described in the above explanation it was the task of the Hookoo Kai to execute and support measures of the Japanese Military Administration in an atmosphere of friendly cooperation with all inhabitants in order to achieve the ultimate goal of the Holy Greater East Asia War. It was expected that all inhabitants of Java, forming a link in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, would fulfill obligations thereby entailed and sacrifice everything for the successful termination of this "Holy War."

The Tonari Gumi formed the lowest bodies in the Jawa Hookoo Kai. Their task was:

- a. active support to police and Keiboodan (village guards) in the defence of their country and during air raids, against enemy parachutists, enemy espionage, natural calamities, fire and crime.
- b. to make the inhabitants understand the aims of laws, regulations, etc. of the Military Administration.
- c. stimulation of increased food production; encouragement of delivery of these products to the authorities; the distribution of daily necessities.
- d. general support to the Military Administration, e.g., by protecting members of families of Peiho (auxiliary troops), volunteers and romushas (coolies) who had left their villages.
- e. mutual help and assistance.

The Jawa Hookoo Kai (Corporation for Common Services in Java) was meant to absorb all organizations pursuing similar aims. The Putera itself, for instance, had been dissolved. The Fujin Kai (Womens' Corporation) was incorporated in the Jawa Hookoo Kai; so were the Mashumi, the Kekyo Sokai (Corporation of Chinese), the Taiiku Kai (Sports Corporation), the Keimin Bunka Shidosha (Cultural Corporation), etc.

In the same way the Corporation of Japanese Nationals was made a division in the Jawa Hookoo Kai.

The same is true of the Arab and Indian communities.

Thus the entire Asiatic population of Java was coordinated and subordinated to the Japanese propaganda machine.

The Eurasian group, already severely hit by the occupation, was forced to collaborate. As far as its members had not yet been interned, they were economically weakened and had no choice but to cooperate with the Tonari Gumi and were thus controlled by the Jawa Hookoo Kai.

11. Reign of Terror Intensified.

The activities by the Eurasians for their mutual support, entailed systematic prosecution by the Kenpei-tai (Military Police) and were stamped out. Dozens of their leaders died in prison during the occupation as a result of ill-treatment, starvation, contagious diseases (caused by crowded prisons without sufficient sanitation) or sentences by courts martial.

By these means the Japanese tried to break the resistance of the Eurasians as they did with any other group, which did not succumb to Japanese propaganda. This reign of terror was aggravated by morbid spy-scare on the part of the Japanese; anyone who once attracted suspicion was tortured in such a way that false confessions were a daily occurrence; and these in turn often brought fresh victims within the clutches of the Kenpei-tai.

This reign of terror threatened other groups of the population as well. As a typical example of this, what happened in 1944 in the town of Pontianak on the west coast of Borneo may be recalled. More than 1200 prominent Indonesian and Chinese, including the local nobility, were executed on an entirely unfounded suspicion of conspiracy. Also in Java the Indonesians were in constant fear of the Kenpei. Freedom of speech was out of the question, even amongst friends; the greatest care had to be taken as spies were around everywhere. Hundreds of examples can be given of people of all races who were most cruelly tortured on the strength of reports of a usually entirely innocent conversation, torturing by means of the "water-cure", electrification, hanging by limbs, use of boa constrictors, etc.

12. The other Islands.

Outside Java the same policy was adhered to in regard to political and religious activities.

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Here again, Tojo's promise resulted in a number of

prominent Indonesians - if prepared to cooperate - being appointed to posts in the Administration. Bodies similar to the Sangi Kai (local Advisory Councils) were established but this process was considerably slower than in Java. Territories administered by the Navy in turn were slower to follow than those under Army Occupation. In the Naval areas (Celebes, Borneo, etc.) the stage where Tyuuoo Sangi-In (Central Advisory Council) was formed was never reached. In Sumatra, however, a Tyuuoo Sangi-In for that island was installed at Fort de Kock in February 1945.

A further difference from Java was to be noted in the fact that no organization similar to the Putera was permitted in spite of requests from Indonesian intellectuals.

Compared with Java, propaganda in the other islands was even more concentrated on the younger generation.

"Volunteers Corps" similar to the Giyu Gun were established.

13. Intensification of Japanese Propaganda.

The Japanese propaganda had now become fully organized. The four basic aims were given full play during the course of 1944. The slogan of "Asia for the Asiatics" was thoroughly exploited while at the same time religious passions were systematically incited.

Furthermore, the Japanese worked upon all sections of society by holding courses of instruction. The first group to be dealt with was that of school teachers, followed later by policemen, heads of villages, minor officials of the civil service, higher officials, doctors, pharmacists, lawyers and personnel of all government offices. Even the smallest group was given attention in turn.

The idea of these courses was to arouse the emotional instincts of each individual in a crude way in order to spot points of response, so as to engulf him in the wave of hatred,

which the Japanese wanted to raise against everything Western.

This propaganda, however crude, was to some extent successful, partly due to chaotic conditions and the distress and hardships suffered by the population.

The Japanese clearly realized the potential dangers of this situation. It was the task of the propaganda service to bend these sentiments in some other direction by way of distraction from Japan's occupation, which was the cause of daily privation and heavy pressure imposed on the population. Distraction was sought in a constantly increasing campaign of hatred against the Occident, especially against the United States and Britain, which countries, together with Holland as a good third, were held responsible for all the sufferings of the population.

It was necessary for the Japanese to lay increasing stress on the national element in their propaganda, because their incitement of hatred was mainly based on race discrimination.

IV. FOURTH PHASE

Further promises.

September 1944 - August 1945.

1. Koiso's Promise.

The strategic situation outside Java meanwhile had considerably changed. The break-through at Saipan had occurred and violently shook the very foundations of the Japanese defence. The Tojo cabinet was succeeded by the Koiso cabinet, which had to face the isolation of the Southern Regions and the necessity for the Japanese troops there to stand by themselves.

The Japanese need for cooperation of the population consequently gained more and more importance.

When the way in which Tojo's promise was going to be realized became known in August 1943, disappointment was expressed rather clearly among those prominent Indonesians, who still placed confidence in Japan's promises. This served as a warning to the Japanese that they had to accelerate satisfying nationalist aspirations in the Southern Regions if they were to retain the full cooperation from this group.

Even this category began to see through the realization of Tojo's promise concerning participation in the administration of their local government, which was merely a camouflage with little reality. After the cooling down of the initial enthusiasm fanned by propaganda, here again the policy of empty promises began to be apparent.

In view of these circumstances it was logical that Premier Koiso on 7 September 1944 during the 85th Session of the Diet, after he had promised Korea and Formosa equality of rights enjoyed by the Japanese, also made a further promise in regard to the Southern Regions. The part of his address relating to these regions reads as

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follows (Prosecution Doc. No. 454, Court Ex. No. 277):

"As to the East Indies, Japan permitted the inhabitants
"to participate in politics according to their wish.
"The inhabitants throughout the East Indies have
"continuously endeavored to carry out the Greater
"East Asia War, recognizing the real intention of
"Japan. They have also been cooperating remarkably
"with the military government there. In view of these
"facts we declare that we intend to recognize their
"independence in the future in order to ensure the
"eternal happiness of the East Indian race. In this
"way the Japanese government intends to continue with
"her former policy toward Greater East Asia and by
"developing strongly the spirit of the Greater East
"Asia Joint Declaration, she expects to live up to
"the trust of the nations of Greater East Asia. Thus,
"if Greater East Asia, with Japan as its center and
"under the firm belief of victory, further increases
"its solidarity, concentrates its forces both
"spiritually and materially, and prosecutes ardently
"the "Holy War", which aims at the reconstruction
"of Greater East Asia, we firmly believe that we can
"destroy the ambitions of America and England and can
"express our ideals concerning the world forever."

Here again is a vague promise: it was not made clear exactly what region would gain independence when granted; the promise of independence involved the condition to defend their own territory for the support of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. The extent of this so-called independence was only defined by the reference to membership of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere as an application of the Hakko Ichiu ideal.

/ Previously

Previously, towards the end of August 1944, the 16th Army Headquarters in Java had been informed confidentially of the contents of this statement. This Headquarters consequently had an opportunity to prepare itself and issued the following secret orders to various Japanese organizations. The text of these orders, which documents have been recovered in the building used by the Gansaikanbu, during the Japanese occupation of Batavia, reflects so accurately the position of the Japanese "Masters" and the way in which Japanese propaganda was handled, that quotation of the whole text seems justified.

The first document (Prosecution Doc. No. 2756) reads as follows:

"SECRET

COPY

"Osamu San To Ho No. 142.

"

" Notification regarding the measures ensuing from
" the proclamation of admission of the Independence
" of the East Indies.

"

"From: Chief of Staff Osamu Army Corps.

"To: 7 September 1944.

"

" We hereby notify you that, based on the Prime Minis-
" ter's proclamation regarding the Granting of the
" independence of the East Indies at the 85th Special
" Session of the Diet today, the 7th of September, it
" is decided that the army will meet the situation
" properly generally in accordance with the following
" stipulations:

"

"1. The purport of the granting of independence shall be
thoroughly

" thoroughly understood (based on the Prime Minister's
" Speech).
"

"2. It is not permitted to touch upon the time, (T.N. of
" the granting of independence) the sphere of the East
" Indies nor the form of government until these are
" finally decided.

"3. National consciousness must be raised to the highest
" degree; especially during the execution of the war
" this must be utilized to strengthen defence, cooper-
" ation with Military Government, and to make Japan and
" Java one and inseparable.
"

"4. There shall be no great alterations in the operations
" and the business structure of Military Government.
" However, participation in the Government shall be
" enlarged and strengthened, and political training shall
" be carried out.
"

"5. Nationalistic speeches and activities shall be actively
" allowed; for that purpose the following measures shall
" be taken:

" a. Permission to sing the national anthem and to use
" the national flag.

" b. The use of nationalistic terms such as "The Indonesian
" people" shall not be restricted.

" c. The appointment of nationalists.

" d. Those advocates of independence who are connected
" with the Communist Party shall not be allowed to exist.
"

"6. Investigation and study necessary for independence
" executed by the local inhabitants under the guidance
" of Military Government shall be recognized. /
"

- "
- "7. Thorough measures shall be taken for the spreading of
" the Japanese language, the adoption of Japanese
" institutions and the infusion of the Japanese culture.
"
- "8. There shall be no distinction between the natives and
" other races, especially those who are to be treated as
" local inhabitants, but they must be made to understand
" the elemental point that they must participate in the
" construction of a new society, and must cooperate with
" all their might.
"
- "9. All Japanese must realize and put into practice the
" mission of this new era in which the divine work of
" "Hakko-ichu" (H.F. same as ichiu, i.e., the whole world
" one family) is to be carried out. Especially the idea
" of colonial subjugation has to be banned; and towards
" the natives we must be like parents and elder brothers
" and sisters, approaching them with affectionate feelings
" while instructing and guiding them sternly. Haughty and
" arrogant speech or behaviour shall not be allowed under
" any circumstances.
"
- "10. In guiding the public opinion stress shall be laid on
" the raising of national consciousness, the intensification
" of war-mindedness, confidence in and reliance upon Japan
" and the desperate determination to win complete victory
" ensuing therefrom, and on the manifestation of leader-
" ship in carrying out these things.
"
- "11. Looking at the other side of the joy on the granting of
" independence we naturally anticipate the confusion
" accompanying shifts and changes of powers, but it is
" absolutely forbidden to meddle in these; we must guide
" them

" them always standing aloof.

"

"12. Although the insatiability which springs from the

" Indonesian character may sometimes provoke our resent-

" ment, we must not be hostile, but guide them, sternly

" indicating the established policy; a so-called

" flattering attitude is not allowed.

"

"13. As for the instruction of the Volunteer Defence Corps,

" on this occasion particularly we must scrutinize the

" attitude of officers and men towards them, and the main

" points of the instruction in order to deepen the feeling

" of unity; and we must not let them get the feeling that

" they form an independent army. Special attention shall

" be paid to the training of instructors.

" This also applied to the Hoi-Mo (T.M. Auxiliary troops).

"

"14. In observing the real situation of the people we must

" not fall into the superficial view that the aim of

" securing their confidence in Japan and raising their

" war-mindedness has been attained, by judging from their

" enthusiasm and festive excitement; but we must observe

" them, guiding them firmly and continually according to

" our principle of guidance.

"

"15. Planning and execution in the field of general direction

" shall be the duty of Military Government, and others

" must cooperate with it.

" There must be no inconsistency whatsoever in carrying

" out the policy.

"

"16. In general the several functions will be as follows:

" a. The 7th day of September is designated as National

" Independence Commemoration Day, and the week from the

"

/ 7th

" 7th until the 13th shall be the National Festival
 " (temporary name) and thanksgiving functions will be
 " performed at that time.
 " b. On the 7th the Provincial Governors shall assemble
 " and the Commander-in-Chief will indicate the policy
 " to cope with the new situation.
 " c. On the 8th it is anticipated that a ceremony will be
 " held at which the representatives of the inhabitants
 " will express their gratitude.
 " d. On the 9th or the 10th a special session of the
 " Council shall be convened in every province and the
 " special municipality, and on the 11th, a special session
 " of the Central Council."

 The second document (Prosecution Doc. No. 2757) reads as follows:

"66
 "CONFIDENTIAL (T.V. in circle)
 "COPY (T.V. in circle)

"Basic Outline of Propaganda and Enlightenment attendant on
 "the Proclamation re Recognition of the Independence of the
 "East Indies.

"

"GUNSEIYANBU (Inspectorate of Military Administration).

"

September 7, 1944.

"

(Showa 19)

"

Policy.

"

" Based upon the statement of the Commander-in-Chief,
 " to promote the racial consciousness of the Indonesians and
 " to incite this into a hostile feeling for the complete
 " prosecution of the war to exterminate the U.S.A. and
 " Britain.

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 " Britain.

" Outline.

- "
- "1. The promotion of the racial consciousness of the
" Indonesian Race by the establishment of racial ideals
" shall be planned.
"
- "2. The responsibility and efforts of the race shall be
" stressed, in addition to which they shall be made to
" realize their aggravated mission for the complete
" prosecution of the War, and the inspiration which may be
" aroused shall be incited into a hostile feeling for
" the complete prosecution of the War to exterminate the
" U.S.A. and Britain.
"
- "3. Measures necessary for the Independence shall be left
" entirely to the Army, and they (T.M. the people) shall
" be made to understand the necessity of offering them-
" selves entirely for defence and services to the
" Military Administration during the War.
"
- "4. They shall be made to look back upon the process of the
" glorious spreading of creed or "Hakko-riu" (T.M. same
" as ichiu, i.e. making the whole world as one family)
" and the realization of the national policy of the
" Empire (T.M. Japan) by means of the independence and
" participation in the government of Burma and the
" Philippines; in this way they shall be induced to
" increase their confidence in and reliance upon the
" Empire (T.M. Japan) and also to manifest their deep
" emotion for the August Virtue of His Majesty and the
" sincerity of their devotion to the Emperor.
"

"5. Those who have blamed persons cooperating with the Army
 " or those who have been negative in their cooperation
 " with Japan, while maintaining a dubious attitude, shall
 " be ostracized, and the fact that Cooperation with the
 " Military Administration implies the Prosperity of
 " Indonesia shall be clarified, thereby forcing out and
 " checking all critical speech and actions,
 "

"6. By emphasizing (T.N. the significance of) the Great
 " East Asia Conference and the Joint Declaration of Great
 " East Asia, and by the process of realization (T.N. of
 " the ideals) thereof, they shall be made to become
 " conscious of a feeling of certainty regarding the
 " Construction.
 "

"7. In order to check the enemies' counterpropaganda before-
 " hand, they shall be reminded of the past when they groaned
 " for ages in misery under Jewish Oppression under the
 " external appearance of dazzling splendour, by tracing back
 " the history of the atrocities of the U.S.A., Britain and
 " Holland.
 "

"8. The cooperation of the Chinese Residents, Half-castes
 " and Arabs is also worthy of attention. It shall be
 " emphasized that these people too, while basking in the
 " new glory similarly to the Indonesians, must, together
 " with the latter, exert themselves towards the construction
 " of a new society; and the policy of concord of all the
 " peoples with the Indonesian Race as the nucleus shall be
 " adhered to.
 "

"9. The new policy shall be glorified by utilizing the actual
 " results and the present condition of the cooperation of the

" people, the policy of the organization of the Volunteer
" Defence Corps and the participation in the government as
" the background.

" Measures.

"
"1. Every kind of information-organization and primitive
" method shall be utilized.

"
"2. Newspapers shall issue extra-bulletins; there shall be
" no suspension of publication on Sundays; and on the first
" and second days four page newspapers shall be issued.

"
"3. As for movies, the functions during a week after the official
" announcement shall be filled and edited, by also taking
" into consideration the effects in foreign countries.

"
"4. In the broadcasting the text of the official announcement
" in Tokyo, the statement of the Commander-in-Chief and the
" talks of the Authorities of the Military Administration
" etc. shall be repeated, accompanied by clear and cheerful
" music. Moreover, the inspiration and the determination of
" the native inhabitants shall be put in the daily programmes.

"
"5. The national flag of Great Japan shall be hoisted for
" one week from the day of the Official Announcement.

"
"6. The details of this Outline shall be planned and executed
" by the Department of Propaganda in cooperation with the
" Bureau of Native Affairs.

"
" To be distributed for office-purposes to:

/

- "
 - " Department of Propaganda (including news correspondents),
 - " Bureau of Native Affairs,
 - " Bureau of Japanese Affairs.
-

The promise made on 7 September 1944 by Premier Koiso was announced in Java by the Commander-in-Chief in, inter alia, the following words:

"As for the nation that will be set up in the future,
"it will be a just and true nation that will become a
"link in the Greater East Asiatic Co-prosperity Sphere
"and has the duty to contribute in the development of
"Greater East Asia under the leadership of Dai Nippon.

"
"Therefore, if all inhabitants like to raise the standard
"of the nation that will be set up so that it will become
"one of the Greater East Asiatic nations in the true
"sense, then it is very necessary that they train themselves
"unceasingly to become a Greater East Asiatic people
"until the final victory is achieved, i.e., by thoroughly
"convincing themselves as a Greater East Asiatic people.

"
"Suppose the final victory will not be won, then the
"construction of Greater East Asia cannot be materialized,
"and as a matter of course, the East Indies will not get
"their independence.

"
"Therefore, all inhabitants must exert all their efforts
"to win the final victory in a sphere of perfect friend-
"ship between all nationalities.

"
"They must patiently endure all hardships and they also

/
must

" must remove all obstacles that might come up in the
" future.

"
" And therefore, while waiting for the arrival of the
" moment of that glorious independence, all the inhabitants
" must work hard for the continuance of this war. With
" such an attitude the duties for the future can be fulfilled

As mentioned in the orders quoted above, the so-called
"gratitude" of the Indonesians for Koiso's promise remained
the theme on which the Japanese propaganda continued to play
for months to come.

At the same time, 16th Army Headquarters were instructed
to advise the section concerned of the Ministry of War at
Tokyo as to what area should be declared "independent", the
date on which this was to take place, and the form of the new
government and state.

The Military Government of Java in reply submitted a
report entitled "Gist of Measures for Guiding Independence";
in which it was proposed to make Java independent first.
Measures suggested to strengthen the national consciousness
were as follows:

a. Institution of the Ken Koku Gakuin (Academy for the
Building of the State).

b. Increased "participation in the administration."

The attitude of the Japanese Navy as regards this problem
was ambiguous owing to lack of interest. This was true for
the Naval High Command at Tokyo as well as for local head-
quarters.

Thus, for the time being Koiso's promise had no
practical effect, with only two exceptions. On 8 September
1944 the population was allowed henceforward to fly the
Indonesian alongside the Japanese flag on certain specified
holidays, subject to strict regulations as to place and size.

/It

It remained forbidden to show that flag any other day and without giving the Japanese flag the place of honour. On Government buildings of the Administration the Japanese flag only was to be flown.

On that same date permission was given to sing the "Indonesia Raya"-song (Song of Great Indonesia) as the national anthem.

On 11 September 1944 the Commander-in-Chief convoked a special session of the Tyuuo Sangi-In (Central Advisory Council), in order to answer the following question put by him:

"In which way can the intense gratitude of the Indonesian inhabitants for the promise of future independence for the East Indies be shown to the Imperial Japanese Government and the Japanese Army and how can the will of the population to fight to death in order to bring about the destruction of America and England still further be enhanced?"

An extraordinary session of the Tyuuo Sangi-In (Central Advisory Council) was held on 17 November 1944 in commemoration of the first anniversary of the "Charter of Greater East Asia", when a motion was adopted to lay down a so-called "Pancha Dharma" (Five Rules for the Conduct of Life) as a "compass" for the Indonesian population.

This "Pancha Dharma" reads as follows:

"For the Indonesian people, to wit:

- "1. We, along with other nations in Greater East Asia,
" are in this war one in life and death with Dai
" Nippon, and will contribute our efforts in all
" sincerity because this present war stands up for
" justice and righteousness.
- "2. We found an Indonesian State that is independent,
" unified, sovereign, just and prosperous and that
" always will value the spiritual merits of Dai-Nippon,

/ and

" and that will live as a true member in the family-sphere
" of Greater East Asia.

"3. We will sincerely endeavour to achieve a glorious greatness by way of keeping up and elevating our own civilization and culture, by helping to develop the Asiatic culture and by beautifying the world's culture.

"4. While maintaining strong and lasting friendly relations with the nations of Greater East Asia, we serve our country and people with all our heart and with an unwavering mind while we will always believe in God Almighty.

"5. With a united and burning desire we strive for the achievement of an ever-lasting Worldpeace based on the family-conception of the whole mankind according to the principle of Hakko Ichiu."

After having harped on Indonesian "gratitude" for several months a new impulse had to be given to propaganda. On 1 December 1944 the application of Tojo's promise (participation in the Administration) was extended to the appointment of Indonesian "Huku-Syuutyokan" (Vice Governors) in several Syuu. Several more Indonesian Sanyo (Advisors) were appointed to the various Departments of the Gunseikanbu, while a Sanyo-Kaigi (Board of San-yo) was established, which would meet regularly to advise the Gunseikanbu in the periods when the Byuuoo Sangi-In (Central Advisory Council) was not in session.

2. Progressive Militarization of the Indonesian Population.

Meanwhile the propaganda service had introduced a new slogan, and activities for the "Benteng Perjuangan Jawa" (Java One Fortress) were in full swing. The object was to bring the population to the maximum war effort in view of the threat of an Allied landing, now openly anticipated. Air Raid Defence and Fire Brigade drills were daily routine but besides, the

/
population

population was worked upon by the powerful propaganda machinery and trained in guerilla fighting. They were instructed in the methods of destroying small enemy formations with primitive weapons (bamboo spears hardened in fire) and by mass action.

Fostering of hate reached new heights. During a propaganda meeting in Batavia effigies of Roosevelt, Churchill and Van der Plas (a prominent Dutch administrator) were burnt after having been paraded through the whole town. American, British and Dutch flags were painted on the roads and trampled upon by processions during a propaganda demonstration. Incitement of the population increased; religious propaganda exerted itself to cause the Mohammedans to declare Holy War on the Occidental Powers in order to bring religious fanaticism into play.

Three new semi-military organizations were established during this period, viz:

a. To the Jawa Keskoo Rahi (Central Corporation for Communal Services) a Defence Corps was attached, called "Pelopor".

b. A similar Corps was attached to the Mashumi (the Islamic Corporation) called "Hizbullah" (Army of Allah).

c. In every Syuu (Residency), Jibakutai (Self-immolation or Suicide Squads) were established whose training, similarly to that of the "Pelopor" and the "Hizbullah", was aimed at guerilla warfare.

The Tonari Gumi (Neighbourhood Associations), finally, were used as a reinforcement for the Keiboodan in the defence of the village.

On no occasion were these simple villagers ever told that such action on their part in war time would constitute a violation of the Rules of Land Warfare and would force the opposing party to treat them as 'francotireurs'.

3. Effects of Incitement.

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3. Effects of Incitement.

Early in 1945 the Japanese awoke to the fact that the hate instilled by them might be turned against themselves and that it might not always be possible to keep this xenophobia, provoked by them, focussed on "foreigners".

One night in February 1945, a detachment of the Volunteer Defence Corps at Blitar (East-Java) made a surprise attack on the Japanese guarding the armory, captured the arms as well as key-points in the town, e.g., Kempai HQ, the Telegraph and Telephone Exchange, etc. Subsequently, an orgy of murder and robbery ensued, the victims being all non-Indonesians. These included what few Lurasians were still free, but also, and even particularly, Japanese, Chinese, Arabs and Indians.

The xenophobia instilled by the Japanese propaganda was beginning to bear fruit. In the course of the next days the movement was partly settled by compromise, partly stamped out by violence and bloodshed.

4. Results of the "Volunteers" rebellion.

It had become clear that the hate instilled by the Japanese threatened to rebound against themselves.

Another indication of internal difficulties could be observed in increasing resistance against Japanese regulations in the economic field, especially against the delivery of agricultural produce and the recruiting of romusha (native labor).

In order to overcome this resistance, strong measures were adopted against Indonesian civilian officials who were held responsible for the poor results in recruiting. Many were dismissed and substituted by nationalist and occasionally by Islamic politicians, in conformity with stipulation 5 (c) in the Gunseikanbu Notification dated

7 September 1944, which has already been cited. These politicians had come to the fore through the Java Pookoo Kai, (Central Corporation for Communal Services) or through the religious courses. The fact that these new arrivals in the Indonesian administrative corps were not fully competent, made little difference since they always had a Japanese advisor. In this way the Japanese succeeded in staffing roughly one third of this corps with nationalists favourably disposed towards themselves. Nevertheless, neither the required delivery of foodstuff nor the recruitment of coolies and volunteers were achieved by many Ken (Regencies).

It became uncomfortably clear to the Japanese that they were increasingly dependent upon the cooperation of the population and that they had to bear the consequences of their own propaganda. For this reason, a Ken-Koku-Gakuin was instituted after approval from Tokyo. The installation of this "Academy for the Building of the State" took place on 29 April 1945. The object was to influence the minds of the future "leaders" of the "independent" state and to imbue them with ideals of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere led by Japan, and with a correct conception of this leadership.

Meanwhile, Java Headquarters pressed higher authorities for a speedy solution. On 30 April 1945, a conference took place at Singapore and was attended by Soomubutyoo (Chiefs of General Affairs Departments) of all areas under the command of the 7th Area Army, comprising Java and Sumatra and commanded by Itagaki. At this conference which was called for a discussion of measures necessary in regard to the population in various areas, the Soomubutyoo of Java explained to what extent the national
consciousness

consciousness of the Indonesians had now been fully awakened and emphasized the fact that there was no other way to regain the confidence of the population but by carrying out the promise of independence.

As a result, Field Marshal Terauchi's Headquarters at Saigon on 15 May 1945 requested views of local Headquarters on "independence." Java promptly responded with a proposition to declare the whole of the Netherlands East Indies independent within a year. The reply given by Singapore was disappointing. The issue was dodged and it was said that the time was not yet to initiate independence.

Subsequently, on 20 May 1945 a meeting was called of all Chiefs of Staff at Singapore. The conference recognized that the war was turning against Japan. Java was allowed to convene a "Dokuritsu Chosa Junbi Iin" (Committee for the Study of Preparations for Independence). This committee was installed on 28 May 1945, and took a solemn oath of loyalty and of "sehidup senati sama Nippon" (to live and to die with Japan).

For the sake of clarity, it may be pointed out that the above conference was instigated by the General Officer Commanding the 7th Area Army (Itagaki) and consequently restricted itself to territories occupied by this Area Army, i.e., only Sumatra and Java in the Netherlands East Indies.

"Naval" territories (Borneo, the Celebes, the Lesser Sunda Isles, etc.) were not represented at this conference. Measures discussed, therefore, only related to "Army" areas which, as a matter of fact, narrowed down to Java. In Sumatra, political developments lagged behind that of Java; not until February 1945 was a Tyuuc Sangi-In (Central Advisory Council) for Sumatra installed.

The Dokuritsu Chosa Junbi Iin (Committee for the Study of Preparations for Independence) consisted of approximately 60

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members

members, including four Chinese, one Indo-Arab and one Eurasian. A Japanese, the Syuutyoo (Resident) of Cheribon Syuu (Residency), was Deputy Chairman. Seven other Japanese were "special members". The Committee had an Administrative Bureau, again with a Japanese Deputy Chief.

The Ordinance founding this Committee laid down that its findings had to be reported to the Gunseikan. Later, a new "Committee for the Preparation of Independence" would be formed. It was clearly stipulated that the "Committee for Study" was to confine itself to study and was not empowered to make any decision.

The Committee met twice, from 29 May to 2 June and from 10 to 16 July 1945. These meetings were not open to the public. Among other things, a constitution resembling that of the Philippine puppet-state was drafted.

When, after all the Japanese stimulation of national consciousness, it became known that the Committee had no powers to make decisions, again disappointment was caused among Indonesians. In addition, in reply to the question over what territories the preparations for independence were to extend, it was said that the Committee had been installed by the Commander-in-Chief, Java, who had no authority over other areas, and that, therefore, the Committee had to restrict itself to Java.

5. Tokyo Policy in regard to the Position of the Southern Regions within the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

Even before the outbreak of the Greater East Asia War, high Japanese authorities, both military and civilian, devoted a great deal of study to the position of the Southern Regions within the Co-prosperity Sphere. Possibilities varied between administering these areas as a colony and granting them puppet-independence. As has been emphasized in

Prosecution

Prosecution Doc. No. 1987B, Court Exhibit No. , after occupation Japan was in a position to prescribe all matters concerning the type of sovereignty, policies, culture and economy of these regions. One objective remained of paramount importance, viz., the Japanese Empire desired complete political, economic and cultural control over these areas,

Various plans were drafted in course of time by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the High Command and the Total War Research Institute. (Prosecution Doc. No. 637A, Court Ex. No. 628; Prosecution Doc. No. 790A, Court Ex. No. 1169; Prosecution Doc. No. 1443, Court Ex. No. 1176; Prosecution Doc. No. 1112A, Court Ex. No. ; Prosecution Doc. No. 1987A, Court Ex. No. ; Prosecution Doc. No. 1621B, Court Ex. No. ; Prosecution Doc. No. 2402B, Court Ex. No. ; Prosecution Doc. No. 2754).

Opposing plans in regard to the status of the East Indies may be discerned. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the High Command agreed on the granting of so-called independence to Burma and the Philippines, but disagreed in relation to the East Indies. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs favoured the establishment of a puppet-state in the south with the exception of certain areas which would remain under Japan's direct control for military purposes.

Both Army and Navy High Commands, however, thought the granting of puppet-independence to the East Indies premature and wished to retain these regions under more or less direct administration.

Top-secret plans, drafted pre-war by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs bear out the latter's policy, following in outline:

1. The Netherlands East Indies were to be included in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere (with Japan, Manchukuo and China as centre), in which the various areas were to

- be coordinated politically, culturally and economically.
2. Some degree of independence was to be given the Netherlands East Indies either by threat of armed force or by stimulation of the nationalist movement. Japanese advisers were to occupy key positions in the new state. Certain less developed areas, like Borneo, New-Guinea and Timor were to belong to the new state, but their administration was to be entrusted to Japan.
 3. Economic agreements were to be concluded with the new puppet-state for the development and exploitation of its natural resources under a planned economy (both internally and externally with regard to the Co-prosperity Sphere) with an exchange agreement.
 4. A protective treaty under the name of military alliance was to be concluded aimed at coordinating the military and diplomatic policy of the new state with that of Japan.
 5. Military bases were to be ceded or leased to Japan. Singapore was to be an area under direct Japanese administration and islands surrounding it (Netherlands East Indies territory) were to be incorporated.

Plans drafted by the High Command and the Total War Research Institute envisaged a puppet form of self-government rather than puppet independence for the East Indies.

Moreover, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs favoured recognition of a puppet form of independence soon after occupation, whereas the High Command was not prepared to even grant puppet self-government until some time after the conclusion of the war. The Total War Research Institute regarded the East Indies as a pawn for negotiation in case the war should not end in a decisive victory for Japan.

All authorities, however, agreed that Occidental influence had to be expelled from the East Indies to a degree which

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which was in most cases made dependent on the measure of success gained by Japanese arms. It is clear from these plans what the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had in mind in regard to the so-called independence of the East Indies; for reasons of its own, this Ministry preferred a puppet variety of independence to direct colonial rule or to a puppet-variety of self-government. In essence, however, there was no difference between the policies of the Ministry and the High Command; both desired complete political, economic and cultural control over these areas.

The Total War Research Institute in particular made a close study of policies to be followed during a war, in, inter alia, the East Indies. The general congruity is striking between the plans drafted by this Institute on "Military Affairs" "Politics", "Economics", "Spiritual Civilization" (Thought and Culture) in regard to the Southern Regions, and actual development there. (Prosecution Doc. No. 16219, Court Ex. No.) according to these plans, the granting of independence to the Philippines (conditional upon positive cooperation in the war) was to be accelerated as much as possible without waiting for the termination of the war, as this policy was calculated to stimulate aspirations to independence among other native peoples within the Co-prosperity Sphere. The Indonesians would be given reason to hope that independence would be granted them after a certain period subsequent to conclusion of the war.

Prior to the date of publication of this plan, Prime Minister Tojo, speaking officially on behalf of the Japanese Government, publicly announced Japanese intentions for the first time at the Diet Session of 22 January 1942 (Prosecution Doc. No. 1038B, Court Ex. No.). Independence was promised the Philippines and Burma, if these nations understood the true intention of Japan and cooperated as members of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. If the Netherlands

Netherlands East Indies were to continue their resistance against Japan they would be crushed without hesitation. If, on the other hand, the inhabitants were to understand Japan's true intention and were to cooperate, support would be given to their development and welfare with full understanding on the part of Japan.

This declaration involved no promise of "independence" to the East Indies. The future status of these areas within the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere was left uncertain.

At the Liaison Conference between Imperial Headquarters and the Government of Japan held on 20 November 1941 (Prosecution Doc. No. 1446, Court Ex. No.), general policy as well as details of military government to be organized in occupied territories were decided upon. In regard to the future, the only decision taken was that the military administration would be gradually taken over by the new organization which the Government would establish, dependent upon the progress of the Imperial policies toward the occupied territories. Meanwhile, the fundamental policy was to be aimed at restoration of public peace and order, at immediate acquisition of resources vital for Japan's war effort, and at maintaining self-sufficiency for her operational forces. The ultimate reversion of territories overrun by Japan and their disposal was to be decided later. Recalcitrant American, British and Netherlands nationals unwilling to cooperate with the Japanese military government were to be taken against them. A sense of dependence on the Imperial Forces was to be instilled into the native population. A premature growth of a movement for national independence was to be avoided. All important matters concerning Japan's local military administration were to be decided at Liaison Conferences between Imperial Headquarters and the Japanese Government. Forces on the spot would be notified of decisions of the Central Executive by the Army and the Navy respectively.

The policy favoured by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not adopted; the future status of the East Indies remained undecided.

Immediately

Immediately before the landing operations in the Netherlands East Indies, Southern Army Headquarters broadcast propaganda for self-determination on the part of the Indonesian race over Saigon-and Bangkok-Radio, in order to facilitate military operations and post-occupation administration. (Prosecution Doc. No. 2754).

After Japan's occupation of the Netherlands East Indies the local Japanese military authorities pushed the administration along the line of strengthening nationalist tendencies. This was also the case in Burma and the Philippines, where so-called independence was proclaimed later.

General Headquarters, Southern Army, on the other hand, adhered to the principle of suppressing such movements.

In Japan, Army and Navy High Command were strongly opposed even to so-called independence of the East Indies, since it was necessary for the control of raw materials essential to the prosecution of the war to retain the Netherlands East Indies under direct administration, in order to enable Japan to carry through all necessary measures, whereas a policy of racial emancipation, such as the granting of independence would impede Japan's plans.

At the end of September 1942 Count Hideo Kodama, referred to before as one of the civilian advisers to the Commander-in-Chief of Java, visited Tokyo and attempted to arouse interest for the views of the local authorities concerning the East Indies. He discussed the problem of East Indian "Independence" and explained why it was considered inexpedient to divide these territories. The matter, however, remained undecided.

In November 1942, the creation of the Greater East Asia Ministry followed. The deliberations in the Privy Council concerning this draft law supply important clues for the understanding of Japanese intentions under the guise of the Greater Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. (Prosecution Doc. No. 1086). The question

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was closely studied as to whether the institution of this Ministry would not arouse the suspicion that Japan considered the various countries of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere as colonial possessions, which might unfavourably influence the attitude of the local inhabitants. In addition, the position of the new Ministry was discussed in relation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The world was to be divided into two groups; all dealings with the one group (the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere) would be handled by the Greater East Asia Ministry and not by the Foreign Ministry.

The Military Administration exercised by virtue of the prerogatives of the High Command fell outside the direct control of the Greater East Asia Ministry; this Ministry would only provide personnel and take part in discussions concerning general policies for territories under military administration. The Greater East Asia Ministry would make preparations for the ultimate reversion of these territories to its own control. Tojo declared that the military administration would be replaced as soon as feasible by a civil administration and that the local inhabitants would be admitted to Japanese administrative services.

The Privy Council finally rejected this proposal, on the ground that it was incompatible with a proper administration and that it was destined for a military dictatorship. Tojo however, carried through his views.

On 4 January 1943, at last, policy in regard to the Southern Regions was subjected to discussion at a Liaison Conference between Imperial Headquarters and the Japanese Government, when a plan for reversion of sovereign rights in occupied territories was decided upon.

The granting of puppet-independence to Burma and the Philippines was definitely laid down. A decision on the status of

of the Southern Regions, however, met with opposing views from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the High Command and was, therefore, deferred.

Finally, at the Liaison Conference on 31 May 1943, attended by the Emperor, the incorporation of the East Indies in Japanese territory was decided upon. However, Indonesian participation in the Administration was to be introduced. The decision on the incorporation of the East Indies in Japanese territory was not to be published lest it should give the Allies material for propaganda.

At that time Prime Minister Tojo appeared to favour setting up a puppet-state, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued to advocate this policy. The High Command, however, insisted on its strong opposition. Moreover, a number of authorities were of the opinion that, if the Japanese Empire once granted independence, she would be obliged to respect this independence as a point of honour which would involve her in difficulties, in case a negotiated peace had to be considered; they opined that the maintenance of the status quo would be more suitable. Finally, incorporation in Japanese territory was decided upon.

The military authorities on the spot were greatly dissatisfied with this decision. Sukarno was sent to Japan, immediately after the Greater East Asia Conference held in November 1943. Sukarno pressed Premier Tojo to grant independence, but obtained no definite answer.

In August and October 1943, the Philippines and Burma respectively, had gained their so-called independence. These two nations participated in the Greater East Asia Conference in November 1943; the East Indies, however, were not represented, even by an observer.

This Conference revealed the typical picture of the camouflage set-up of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. A "Joint Declaration" was adopted (Prosecution Doc. No. 23390), which reads as follows:

/"The

"The Assembly of Greater East Asiatic Nations.

"

" Joint Declaration adopted on November 6, 1943

"

" It is the basic principle for the establishment of world
"peace that the nations of the world have each its proper place,
"and enjoy prosperity in common through mutual aid and assistance.

" The United States of America and the British Empire have in
"seeking their own prosperity oppressed other nations and peoples.
"Especially in East Asia, they indulged in insatiable aggression
"and exploitation, and sought to satisfy their inordinate
"ambition of enslaving the entire region, and finally they came
"to menace seriously the stability of East Asia. Herein lies
"the cause of the present war.

" The countries of Greater East Asia, with a view to contribut-
"ing to the cause of world peace, undertake to cooperate toward
"prosecuting the War of Greater East Asia to a successful con-
"clusion, liberating their region from the yoke of British-
"American domination, and assuring their self-existence and
"self-defense, and in constructing a Greater East Asia in
"accordance with the following principles:

" 1. The countries of Greater East Asia through mutual
"cooperation will ensure the stability of their region and
"construct an order of common prosperity and well-being based
"upon justice.

" 2. The countries of Greater East Asia will ensure the
"fraternity of nations in their region, by respecting one
"another's sovereignty and independence and practicing mutual
"assistance and amity.

" 3. The countries of Greater East Asia by respecting one
"another's traditions and developing the creative faculties of
"each race, will enhance the culture and civilization of Greater
"East Asia.

" 4. The countries of Greater East Asia will endeavour to
"accelerate their economic development through close cooperation

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upon

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"East Asia.

" 4. The countries of Greater East Asia will endeavour to
"accelerate their economic development through close cooperation

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"upon a basis of reciprocity and to promote thereby the general
"prosperity of their region.

" 5. The countries of Greater East Asia will cultivate friendly
"relations with all the countries of the world, and work for the
"abolition of racial discriminations, the promotion of cultural
"intercourse and the opening of resources throughout the world,
"and contribute thereby to the progress of mankind."

During this Conference, the so-called common destiny of
Greater East Asiatic nations as well as the "necessity" for a joint
struggle against the Allies were emphasized.

The same propaganda as described before was conducted in the
East Indies. Cooperation from the local population in the war
effort became more vital to the local Japanese as time went on.
Local authorities, therefore, made a last attempt to persuade the
Tokyo Government.

Hayashi, at that time the highest civil adviser to the Java
Military Government, was sent to Tokyo with the approval of the
Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Forces in Java to try and
persuade the Japanese authorities concerned to support puppet-
independence of the East Indies.

With the formation of the Koiso Cabinet, opinion favouring
a puppet-state in the East Indies began gradually to gain ground.

At the first session of the Supreme War Direction Council
during the Koiso Cabinet, the announcement regarding East Indies
independence, to be made at the next Session of the Diet, was
drafted as an item in "Measures for War Direction to be adopted
hereafter".

The considerations leading to this policy were as follows:
At that time Japan's defence line on the Pacific front had
collapsed at the Marianas and the American offensive was fast
gaining force. The new Cabinet considered it had to make some
political move to unify Greater East Asia. Needless to say
Foreign Minister Shigemitsu argued for his Ministry's conception

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of a puppet-state. The Army High Command finally agreed to the granting of such independence in the future. This fell in line with the views of Army authorities on the spot, for whom it became more and more difficult to secure the collaboration of the native population with Japan if the problem of independence were left unsettled. But the Navy still stuck to its stiff opposition and reserved its agreement to pushing independence measures in regard to areas under Navy control.

At the session of the Supreme War Direction Council of 5 September 1944, it was, consequently, decided to announce that in the future "independence" would be granted the East Indies, in order to "win over the natives, as well as to clarify the Greater East Asia Policy to all the world."

Policies laid down (Prosecution Doc. No. 2755), stipulated, inter alia, that the areas to be granted independence were expected to be the "former Netherlands East Indies" (with the exception of New-Guinea). This point, however, did not obtain agreement from the Navy, so that the area remained undecided.

The variety of independence and the relations with the Japanese Empire were to be determined separately. Measures were to be taken, however, to ensure that all requirements of the Empire should be fulfilled. The date was also to be fixed later, taking into consideration the development of the natives' political ability; premature granting was to be avoided. Whether or not the whole area was to be granted "independence" simultaneously, or one area after another, was to be determined in consideration of circumstances prevailing at the time of determination.

In Java, the following measures were to be taken and made to appear to be in consequence of native initiative. The tenor of the promise was to be thoroughly understood by the natives. The Military Government was not to be changed overnight, but

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participation

participation by the natives in the administration was to be further increased. They were to be given administrative training. Natives were to be allowed as soon as expedient to investigate matters necessary for their so-called independence. The Indonesian national anthem and national flag, hitherto prohibited were to be permitted.

In other areas similar measures were to be taken as and when circumstances permitted. On this point again the Navy reserved its agreement.

The Navy persisted in its opposition.

Consequently, Prime Minister Koiso merely announced in the Diet that the Japanese Government would grant the East Indies independence in the future. No concrete measures were taken in the matter.

Later, however, the strategic situation became increasingly grave and lines of overseas communication were practically severed. The material requirements of the Japanese Army in Java became more and more pressing and consequently it became increasingly difficult to keep the population in Java and Sumatra favourably disposed with nothing but abstract declarations of "future independence." It had become urgent to adopt concrete measures for its preparation.

On the other hand, the Navy was losing its argument after the loss of the Southern Regions had become inevitable since the fall of the Philippines. From the beginning of 1945 onward the Army and Navy approached agreement.

On 17 July 1945 a meeting was held of the Supreme War Direction Council for the discussion of this problem among others. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Togo Shigenori, had had prepared a memorandum (Prosecution Doc. No. 2758), in which this Ministry - as before a protagonist of puppet-status for the East Indies - proposed to come to the definite decision to grant

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so-called independence to the whole of the East Indies. This proposal was argued by pointing out that the enemy offensive had reached a corner of the East Indies already and that the "natives" might possibly question the sincerity of the Japanese Empire in independence were further deferred. In the opinion of the Ministry it was high time to implement promises made and to announce before the world the date of independence, thus clarifying Japan's sincere intentions to achieve Greater East Asia autonomy. It was argued that, although Java was better fitted for independence, Nationalist leaders would be disappointed if only Java was to be declared independent, and the effectiveness of the measure would be reduced by half.

This Ministry, therefore, strongly favoured granting so-called independence to the entire Netherlands East Indies area. Malaya and British North-Borneo had always existed separately with different traditions, so that it was considered unsuitable and unnecessary to grant those areas independence together with the Netherlands East Indies.

The Ministry also declared itself against the successive granting of independence to various areas as preparations had been completed locally. This would again disappoint Indonesian leaders and might entail formal complications. It would be preferable to declare the entire area "independent" simultaneously as soon as preparations in the main area were completed. The other areas would be theoretically incorporated in the new state but would remain under Japanese military government until preparations for reversion had been completed.

A Committee for Preparation for Independence in Java was to be constituted. If it proved no longer possible - on account of communications - to send delegates from the other areas to Java, then prominent personalities, natives belonging to those other areas, but living in Java, might be selected to represent them.

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As for the date of independence, this Ministry urged, in view of the turn of war and the international situation, not to extend this date beyond the autumn of 1945. In order to meet the international political situation, which was in speedy transition, it was considered necessary to determine that date approximately and to announce same along with the decision of the areas to be declared "independent."

"Independence" was to be proclaimed not by Japan, but by the Committee for the Preparation for Independence, so that it would appear as if puppet-state was not brought about by Japanese guidance or encouragement, but on the contrary, by the free initiative of the East-Indian race.

National policy, the form of Government, the name of the new State, etc., were to be decided by the will of the people. This, at any rate, would be announced in order to emphasize the fact that independence was based on the free initiative of the East-Indian race.

At the meeting of 17 July 1945 of the Supreme War Direction Council (Prosecution Doc. No. 2759), this policy was adopted. The Japanese Empire was to grant the East Indies "independence" as soon as possible, while preparations for that purpose were to be accelerated and intensified immediately. It was laid down that the chief Japanese aim was to raise the natives' racial consciousness further by taking various measures concerning independence, thereby making them contribute to the war effort. Measures would be adopted to prevent or to overcome hindrances to military operations and preparations. Execution thereof was entrusted to local Japanese forces.

6. Preparations for the Foundation of a Puppet State in the Southern Regions.

This decision reached Java on 21 July 1945; according to directives from Tokyo, the territory of the new state was to comprise the whole of the Netherlands East Indies, while a "Committee for the Preparation for Independence" was to be set up in the near future.

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However, emphasis was laid upon the necessity for safeguarding the requirements for military operations. The Headquarters of the Southern Army at Saigon, which had submitted in June 1945 that the establishment of the puppet state should not take place before the middle of 1946, and that the abovenamed Committee should at the earliest be set up towards the end of 1945, was ordered to work out the details.

Consequently, on 30 July 1945 at Itagaki's Headquarters in Singapore a conference was held of the Soomubutyoo (Heads of General Affairs Departments of the Gunseikanbu) of the regions concerned.

At this Conference a scheme was drawn up for guiding preparations for so-called independence, wherein the date was set for the spring of 1946.

V. THE FIFTH PHASE.

Japan's final effort.

The puppet-state within sight.

August-September 1945.

In the beginning of August 1945, Field Marshal Terauchi received telegraphic orders from Tokyo to hasten preparations for the Indonesian puppet-state as much as possible, and to create this state in September 1945.

In pursuance of this order, on 7 August 1945 Terauchi decreed the establishment of the Dokuritsu Junbi In (Committee for the Preparation for Independence).

This was effected by proclamation of the same date, reading as follows:

"Proclamation of the Nanpoo-Gun (Japanese Southern Army).

"

" Concerning the "Committee for the Preparation for
Independence of Indonesia".

" Based on the proclamation of the Japanese Government of
"7 September last year, the Nanpoo-Gun has consistently been
"taking measures to guide the Indonesians. Owing to the
"spiritual awakening of the people up to this moment, they
"have all succeeded in achieving much and fast progress in
"their training for government and for the defence of the
"country with burning enthusiasm.

" In response to the activity and the wholehearted efforts
"of the people, the Nanpoo-Gun expresses its approval of the
"installation towards the middle of August of a Committee for
"the Preparation for Independence of Indonesia; that Committee
"shall accelerate all measures concerning the final prepar-
"ations for the installation of the Government of an independent
"Indonesia.

"

12 o'clock, 7. VIII. 1945."

On the same day on which the proclamation of Marshal
Terauchi was published in Java, the Saikoo Sikikan (Commander-

in

in-Chief) of Java also issued a proclamation, wherein, inter alia, it was stated:

"The desire to become an independent nation has now
"reached a high point and is flaring up all over Indonesia.
"It was in response to the expression of this desire that
"the Dai Nippon Teikoku solemnly promised to grant her
"independence, in accordance with the basic principle of
"the Dai Nippon Teikoku, (Japanese Empire), i.e., the ideals
"of Hakko Ichiu. Since that promise the whole population
"has exerted itself to its utmost to honour the national
"obligations and the stronger became their determination
"to bring the war to a successful conclusion, so that the
"foundations for their independence could be built up fully
"and speedily. And now, as an independent nation, con-
"stituting a link in the chain of the Co-prosperity Sphere
"of Greater East Asia, she will join and take her place in
"the battle-line for the common defence of Greater East
"Asia."

The Gunseikan, (Chief Military Government) on this occasion stated the following:

"The independence of Indonesia as a member of the Co-prosper-
"ity Sphere of Greater East Asia, is based upon humani-
"tarian principles so as to contribute in the formation
"of a new world order. Therefore, the lofty ideals of the
"Indonesians and their intense enthusiasm conform with the
"basic ideals of the Dai Nippon Teikoku, i.e. the spirit
"of Hakko Ichiu.

"A new nation will have to meet some essential requirements:
"it must have sufficient strength, while its administrative
"machinery should be organized in a smooth and simple way.
"Therefore, the first duty is to bring the war now being
"faced by the Indonesians to a successful conclusion. To
"this end the Indonesian nation must develop its war-
"potential to its full extent, and together with Dai Nippon

fight

"fight unceasingly to achieve final victory in this Greater East Asian War."

-- few days of silence on the subject of independence followed; Japanese propaganda continued to elaborate upon the common ties or destiny between Japan and Indonesia:

"To live or die with Japan".

Meanwhile on 9 August 1945, a delegation of three leading Indonesian nationalists, including Sukarno, was flown to Terauchi's Headquarters at Saigon, and received by the Field Marshal on 11 August. They were told by the latter that it was originally intended to send the delegation to Tokyo to receive the Imperial Decree direct from the Japanese Government. On account of difficulties and dangers of communications and pressure of time, the Field Marshal had been instructed to transmit the contents of the Decree to the delegation on behalf of the Imperial Government.

The main points were:

- a. The Japanese Government had been pleased to institute a Committee for the Preparation for Independence.
- b. The territory of the new State would include the entire Netherlands East Indies.
- c. The date when independence would be proclaimed in any territory was to be determined at the discretion of the Imperial Government, as soon as preparations were completed.
- d. The independent Government would be installed first in the island where preparations had been first completed. Subsequently this Government would be gradually extended to include areas where preparations had been completed.
- e. All Japanese demands in connection with the military situation were to be complied with.
- f. Sukarno was appointed Chairman of the Committee, which further consisted of thirteen representatives from Java,

three

three from Sumatra and five from territories under naval occupation. These members were appointed on nomination by local Japanese military commanders.

On 14 August 1945 the newspapers in Java reported the news of Sukarno's return, who was welcomed as the new leader of Indonesia by the Commander-in-Chief and many of the military and Indonesian authorities. Meanwhile, the Committee members from Sumatra, Borneo, the Celebes, and Bali, whose names were not published, were flown to Java, after having received their instructions from the military or naval authorities of those areas.

Originally the first meeting of the Committee was fixed for 19 August.

On 15 August, however, members of the Committee were secretly informed of Japan's capitulation. Great consternation ensued.

During the night of 16 to 17 August 1945, the Committee, augmented by nationalists and youth leaders, prominent during that period, met at the residence of the Japanese Naval Liaison Officer Maeda. Sukarno had, prior to this meeting, conferred with the Soemabutyoo (Chief General Affairs Department) and Maeda. It was decided to proclaim independence the next morning.

The constitution drafted by the Dokuritsu Chosa Junbi Iin (the Committee set up in May for the Study of Preparations for Independence) was hastily altered, and on the following morning the Independence was broadcast by Sukarno through a microphone, installed by the Japanese propaganda service on the verandah of his house.

The population of Java was still uninformed, except through rumour, about the capitulation of Japan. Radio receiving sets had been unfitted to pick up foreign broadcasts, even from Tokyo; on instructions from the Commander-in-Chief, the

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Japanese propaganda service kept Japan's defeat secret.

The newspapers, controlled by the Japanese propaganda service, and the local broadcasting stations between 17 and 21 August 1945 made no mention of anything but the announcement of independence and the proclamation of the constitution.

On 21 August 1945, the papers published, next to the text of the Emperor's broadcast of 14 August on the surrender, a proclamation by the Commander-in-Chief of Java, containing, inter alia, the following words:

"Dai Nippon is and will always be a friend to
"Indonesia, immutably and forever. We never
"will forget our oath; united, in life and
"in death."

Until 21 August 1945 the Japanese authorities had kept Japan's defeat secret; this period has been referred to as the "stolen week". The Japanese used it to advantage to attempt to create a pro-Japanese state even if this were Japan's final effort.
